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from all that terror teaches ... deliver us, good Lord!

H

e ,.;d ;t, but he couldn't have meant ;t, could he? That bu,;ne" about lov;ng yom enemies, and praying for those who persecute you, "so that you may be children of your Father in
heaven." This is part of the classic sequence where Jesus ups the ante for those who would like to be
included in the group known as "children of God." Turn the other cheek to the one who strikes
you. Give not only what you can spare but your basic necessities to someone in need. Anger is as
bad as murder, lust in your heart is as bad as adultery. Don't be public about your religious practice.
Don't save money, don't plan for the future, don't judge others. Matthew ends the sequence with
one of those wonderful understatements: "Now when Jesus had finished saying these things, the
crowds were astounded at his teaching, for he taught them as one having authority, and not as their
scribes." I should think not. Anyone who teaches like this is bound for trouble.
What astounds us in these sayings is the depth of demand in the law as Jesus describes it. How
good do we have to be to satisfy God? The Sermon on the Mount is the most explicit description
of what it would mean to be righteous, and it is terrifying. This is the standard of goodness that
only Jesus can meet, and Christians for two millennia have been vowing that they cling to his name,
and thus claim his righteousness for their own. And in the process, many of us have agreed that
these standards of the law as Jesus expounded it are just so much exaggeration. Anyone who really
cut off his right hand because it committed sin is unable to discern the literary devices of hyperbole. We would all be quick to offer therapy as well as a prosthetic hand to that deluded soul.
Then are we really supposed to love our enemies? We might get out of this by saying that Jesus
was talking about personal enemies, the woman who has cheated you out of money, the man who
has lied about you and ruined your reputation. National enemies are different, because nations can
neither love nor hate. But that excuse is probably too easy. "Love your enemies and pray for those
who persecute you." A prescription that rolls rather easily off the tongue when I think that I don't
have any, when I believe that I am universally loved.
But if there is a real enemy, and the persecution is palpable? What would it mean to love an
enemy whose hatred has touched millions of people with grief and fear and a paralysis of anxiety?
Not a faceless, blameless thing like a hurricane or an earthquake, but a real, specific person, who
lived life among people he hated, and continued to hate right through to the horrific end. Can that
person be loved?
I hope that is part of what many of us struggle with in these days after September 11, 2001.
People write about the various exhaustions of having suffered the trauma, and there is indeed
trauma, even to those who are nowhere near the center of the grief. We will experience it for a long
time, all of us who were Americans on that date. But Christian people are asked to add to their
burden the knowledge that, somehow, they are again falling short of the demands of righteousness
when they fail to love these enemies. Even though we know the demand is one we cannot meet,
our knowledge of the demand separates us from those who can, with impunity, give way fully to
anger and hatred and revenge. It is not a separation that makes us better, but we are under a different set of commands. In our giving, we know full well that even when we have pulled off our
coat, we ought to have given the cloak, and so we can never be self-satisfied in our charity. It is not
enough, therefore, simply to refrain from hateful behavior to innocent people. Anyone can do
that. Who can-who must-love the enemy?
Peace,

GME

Among the other
troubles of the
times, we who are
Christians have to
attempt
the impossible.

Intimations
taking thought for the morrow
John Strietelmeier

This is the second piece in a series commissioned for this year's Cresset concerning the question, "what and
how should the church-related university publish in the 21st century?" Participants have all been editors of
Valparaiso University publications. john Strietelmeier was Editor of The Cresset (1949-1969 ).
-The Editor

Much to the surprise of some, and equally to the chagrin of others, The Cresset has survived
into the new millennium, as has your obedient servant, who had the pleasure and the frustration of
editing it in its Paleolithic years, 1949-1969.
My successor many times removed is a gracious and thoughtful lady who is still young enough
to take thought for the morrow. The morrow she is concerned about is the early years of the 21st
century with focus on the question: "What should a church-related university publish in the first
years of the new century, and how should it do it?" She has tempted me, by appeals to my pride and
my avarice, to set down my thoughts on this matter, which I could do briefly and economically with
the simple, truthful answer: "I haven't the remotest idea."
But I am under contract for a minimum of 1500 words, so I shall have to pad this out with a bit
of reminiscence and a large dollop of speculation.
First the reminiscence. My great-grandfather belonged to the generation that welcomed in the
century which our generation has now left behind. I use the word "welcome" advisedly, because
many of the brightest and best men and women of that generation really believed that their new
century would be new, hopeful, even in some very real sense Christian. They named a magazine for
it-the Christian Century. My great-grandfather died in 1912, just two years before Prinzip murdered the archduke, and Europe blundered into the first of two bloody world wars which not only
destroyed the flower of its young manhood but ripped apart the social fabric of Western civilization. Only in some of the remoter parts of Appalachia and the Great Plains can one still find people
who think that our century is Christian or our country Christian. The culture-and, to a large
extent, the church-which the church-related university seeks to address can best be described as
secular and hedonistic.
Most church-related universities that I know of can also best be described as secular and hedonistic, church-related only in the same sense that third cousins are related to each other. They need
not fret over what to publish because they need only fit into the general pattern of what other
respectable institutions are publishing. Many of them do not publish anything for off-campus distribution except public relations materials celebrating the uniqueness of the institution.
It is possible to make a strong case for such a policy, for religious faith, whether it be Catholic,
Lutheran, Reformed, or Jewish, is by its very nature counter-cultural. It takes a strong president and
a strong board of trustees to resist the incessant demands of some of their co-religionists to "shut
'em up or close 'em down." And a responsible editor does not go out of his way to cause trouble for
his institution.
But, that having been said, it remains a basic fact of life that a university that takes seriously its
church relationship is counter-cultural, in almost exactly the same way that old Simon Peter was
when he was trying to deny any connection to his Lord. His speech betrayed him! He happened to
be cursing and swearing at the time, but the girl in the courtyard was not hearing the words. She
was hearing the accent. And the accent was unmistakably Galilean.
415 The Cresset Reformation l200 1

What, then, should a church-related university publish in the first years of this new century?
Whatever a man or woman of faith considers worth the reader's time-but with a Galilean accent.
Professors have been defined as "people who think otherwise." Those academics who write for The
Cresset might be defined as "people who think and speak otherwise." For examples of what I mean,
read G.K. Chesterton's The Common Man or C.S. Lewis's The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses.
Or read some of the editorials that have appeared in recent years in this magazine.
Surely one thing that the church-related university will want to address in the early years of this
century is the idea of diversity. One of the happiest developments of my lifetime has been the
growing appreciation of diversity as a precondition to the good society. But the uncritical application of that idea to higher education has had some unintended but devastating consequences. When
every college and university is compelled, under sanction of loss of federal funding, to become a
microcosm of the larger society, Notre Dame becomes indistinguishable from Duke, Brigham Young
from Southern Methodist, Brandeis from Valparaiso. The tang of institutional character is lost. And
without the peppery presence of institutions that "think otherwise," the American educational stew
ceases to be a stew and becomes a tasteless pabulum.
This is a vexing problem, for the university, for the church it claims to serve, and for the state.
As citizens, we obviously do not want our tax money going to institutions which are venal or wildly
eccentric. But in a richly pluralistic society, who decides what idea or practice is beyond the boundaries of legitimate diversity? Should the University which I gladly served for almost forty years be
cut off from federal funding because the church body to which it is related denies ordination to
women, thus implicating us in violations of federal and state equal opportunity employment acts?
I purposely chose this example of the blurred limits of acceptable diversity because it is within this
blurred margin that church-related universities more and more find themselves operating as they
attempt to remain faithful to their theological tradition, however wrong it may seem to many of us
in that secular and hedonistic society and church.
The ministry which has been committed to all Christians and to their publications is a ministry
of reconciliation. God did not send His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the
world might be saved through Him. There is a kind of genial cosmopolitanism that our world
hungers for, and which it might, much to its surprise, find in church-related publications which cultivate a gentle sense of humor. Chesterton once observed that "it is the test of a good religion that
you can make a joke about it." And if our Lord was accused of being a man "gluttonous and a wine
bibber," we might ask ourselves what defect in us allows us to escape such a charge. There is, I am
convinced, such a thing as a Christian hedonism. The surprising thing is that I have found it most
often in writers who are considered theologically conservative-Chesterton, Lewis, Russell Kirk,
Bill Buckley, to mention only four of the best. Any one of them could, I am sure, bring a coterie of
loyal readers to any publication that could feature his writing on a regular basis.
And now, rushing in where angels fear to tread, I address that question of how the churchrelated university might make its voice heard in the babel of voices that clamor for attention in our
day. First, though, I must make full disclosure of my qualifications to deal with this question. These
words are being typed on a Royal standard (not electric) typewriter of approximately 1950 vintage.
I am computer-illiterate, not by choice but by temperament. If what follows seems biased against
the electronic media, do not judge me too harshly. I have tried to compensate for my ignorance by
consulting with a media whiz whose competence and judgment I respect.
I can remember when thoughtful writers were asking what we would all do when electronic
gadgetry would take over all of our routine duties, leaving us vast amounts of free time to speculate
about truth, beauty, and the ways of a man with a maid. It hasn't worked out quite that way. The
"paperless office" has not yet emerged, as it surely should have by now. My young colleagues are
awash in an ocean of e-mail and "hard copy" is being generated in record amounts. Where is the
leisure to contemplate the serious, or even frivolous questions that academic people ought to think
about and write about? People are buying mobile faxes and printers for their front-seat auto-offices.
There seems to be a process of dehumanization at work here which does not bode well for at least

the immediate future of magazines that are meant to be more than skimmed by their readers.
A second major concern which impinges on the future of church-related publications is at least
as serious. Librarians are watching with dismay as their electronic data decay after scarcely a third to
a half century of storage, and historical data are irretrievably lost. This is a problem for which, in the
long run, we will find a remedy. But my best information is that we have not yet found that remedy.
Much that a university publishes was never meant for long-term use. I would not presume to
advise my professional colleagues how it should be published. My experience has been with newspapers, magazines, and books-"print journalism" as it is now often called. I believe that it has, and
always will have, a place on the campus. Serious scholarship and debate will require it, and a small
but influential segment of our population will demand it.
It seems appropriate to me to conclude these rambling remarks with some words which I heard
recently from Dr. John Buchanan, senior pastor of Fourth Presbyterian Church in Chicago, former
moderator of the Presbyterian Church USA, and currently editor and publisher of the Christian Century. Dr. Buchanan expressed his conviction that these early years of the twenty-first century will see
a Christian "renascence of faith. " I do not share his optimism, but I devoutly hope that he is right.
-John Strietelmeier

WAITING IS A VERB

for Eric

She kept a baby monitor beside his bed
the receiver she kept in the kitchen where she'd escape to,
to catch her breath and hear in amplification
the desparate drag in and heavy short flush out
of his numbered breaths, now like so many leaves on
a fall tree.
We watched outside the skittish
morning doves flee an empty feeder. It's early
November. The brown leaves on the ground were crispy
beneath the heavy eat's paws. If the feeders are
not filled the morning doves will move off against the
gray skies.
He is past dreaming he's dancing
around a new red bicycle; and they are past
imagining the end; past talking about how
Jesus will come for him himself; now is the wait.
Now to wait.

David Wm. Gibson
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Faith, Reason, and The Liberal Arts
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese

This address was delivered as one of a series in the fall of 2000, marking Valparaiso University's 75th anniversary
as a college of the Lutheran church.
-Editor

uid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?" (Tertullian 7.9) What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? For most of the centuries during which the liberal arts have been transmitted
to American and Western European students, no educated person would have thought to translate
Tertullian's words for an audience composed of other educated people. Today, I know with equal
certainty that I must translate them and that, for the benefit of most members of a typical academic
audience, I should probably identify Tertullian as well. One may hope, as I do, that the need to identify Tertullian is somewhat less pressing when Christians predominate among one's listeners, but
these days, even at a Lutheran university, that hope may be misplaced.
There are many reasons for beginning a discussion of Christian intellectuals' relation to the liberal arts with Tertullian's question, and mine here do not include a desire, once again, to deplore
the woeful state of liberal education in our country today. There is much to deplore, and many
people have done so very ably indeed, but, as my students say, "been there, done that." I do not
expect the average undergraduate, even at a Christian university, to have cultivated much acquaintance with Tertullian or even with the better-known Church Fathers, although I assume that
Lutheran students know something of St. Augustine. The reasons for attending to Tertullian's question lie elsewhere, primarily because the question remains as pressing and pertinent today as at the
close of the second century AD when he first posed it, although few today are likely to agree.
As we enter the third millennium, Christian intellectuals often differ substantially in their attitudes towards education, and some have more in common with secular intellectuals than with more
orthodox Christians of whatever church. To my chagrin, the reading lists at some Catholic universities and colleges would pass unremarked at the trendiest secular institution-and all in the name of
academic freedom. At the other extreme, some Christian intellectuals oppose the least hint of modernist, much less postmodernist, infection in what they regard as the core liberal arts tradition. In
fairness, the majority of those who consider themselves Christian intellectuals or who remain concerned with the special mission of the Christian college or university probably have little sympathy
for the radical secularist position. But their justifiable hostility may blind them to the potential dangers in the simple assumption that, as Christians, we can-or should-continue to transmit an
uncorrupted liberal arts education.
The conception of the liberal arts originated in ancient Greece in questions about the meaning
and purpose of existence that Socrates and other philosophers posed for themselves and their students. During the first century BC, Marcus Terentius Varro codified the curriculum that was
emerging from the explorations and introduced it to Rome, where it settled into the formal structure of seven arts, divided into the trivium and the quadrivium. This was the form, albeit with successive modifications, in which the liberal arts descended to Western Europe and eventually the
United States. The trivium included the verbal arts of logic, grammar, and rhetoric; the quadrivium

At anniversaries we
are concerned about
roots, and Professor
Fox-Genovese digs
deeply to uncover
those of Christian
higher learning.

included the numerical arts of mathematics, geometry, music, and astronomy (Weeks 7-8). The
basic contours of the liberal arts had, accordingly, been established in the Hellenistic world before
the birth of Christ.
Christianity showed an extraordinary ability to absorb elements of ancient philosophy and
culture. The conversion of Gentiles and the growth and consolidation of the major Christian centers outside Israel virtually ensured that the languages of Christian texts, beginning with the
Gospels and the letters of St. Paul, would be Greek and subsequently Latin, which rapidly established itself as the lingua franca of the churches of Western European culture. The Church Fathers
and other Christian apologists and intellectuals had been educated in Greek and Roman schools
by pagan teachers. Tertullian himself, as M.L. Colish's recent scholarship has demonstrated, interwove significant elements of Stoic philosophy and other strands of pagan culture into his Christian polemics and theology. (The Stoic Tradition 10-29)
During the centuries immediately following Tertullian's death, Christianity steadily gained
ground while the political structure of the Roman Empire disintegrated under the pressure of barbarian invasions from without and administrative incompetence and corruption from within.
Edward Gibbon gave the barbarian invasions their due, but, writing from the vantage point of the
British Enlightenment, he was inclined to blame the growth of Christianity for sapping the will and
the purposes of the Roman emperors and political elite. For St. Augustine and other Romans who
lived through the waves of invasion, "no political disaster of this period was as shattering as the first
sack of Rome" by the Visigoths in 410 AD, and the catastrophe provided the impetus for Augustine
to write The City of God. (Colish, Medieval Foundations 35-37; I am indebted to this text for much
of the material in the following three paragraphs.)
Augustine intended The City of God in part as a refutation of the pagan charges that held Christianity responsible for the fall of Rome. Beyond partisan struggles over the attribution of blame,
however, he intended his work as the elaboration of a philosophy of history that could transcend
the specific destiny of Rome. One of Augustine's main contributions lay in his move from the classical view of history as circular, to a view of it as linear. In this view, history begins with the Creation
and progresses through the succession of God's covenants with the Old Testament patriarchs,
"above all Moses, and finally through the incarnation of Christ and His Creation of the Church."
This history will end with the last judgment, the allocation to all of their final habitation, and the
end of time. This trajectory, not the fortunes of any specific nation, "describes the scope and direction of history." Augustine accords Rome a special place within history both because of the Romans'
embodiment of the virtues of moderation, duty, and justice, and because its unification of the known
world facilitated the spread of Christianity. But the real meaning of history lies elsewhere, namely
in the persisting struggle between the city of God and the city of man.
In Augustine's account, the two rival cities embody two foundational psychic drives, and the
conflict between them represents the conflict between two human tendencies that pervade all human
institutions: "the inclination toward rightly ordered love and the inclination toward inordinate
love." In Augustine's view, these two loves have made two cities. "Love of God to the exclusion of
self makes the city of God while love of self to the exclusion of God makes the earthly city." Each
city is defined by its moral principles, and they will remain in tension until the end of time. (36-37)
Augustine leaves no doubt about his assessment of the relative merits of the two cities, but his
emphasis upon the opposing moral stances does not prevent him from valuing both classical culture
and the historical contributions of Rome.
In On Christian Doctrine, Augustine had warmly advocated the embrace and use of classical
learning "for the exegetical and homiletic needs of Christian education," and, in The City of God,
he annexed the ethos and achievements of Rome to the purposes of Christian history. Yet much as
Augustine appreciated classical culture and happy as he was to borrow from it, he departs in important ways from the spirit of its authors. For Augustine insists that classical values and accomplishments constitute a means, not an end. In fidelity to this conviction, he divorced the state-including
the Rome he admired-from the Christian community. In his hands, the Roman Empire became
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"theologically neutral, ... just one set of political arrangements among many." Denying special
standing to any human political institution, Augustine insisted that the empire should not be seen as
part of "a divine providential scheme," or as what historian Richard Fletcher describes as a "vehicle
for the furtherance of God's purposes"(29-30). Augustine, as scholars have demonstrated, absorbed
large doses of classical culture, especially neo-Platonism and Stoicism, but he remained faithful to
his own professed intention of subordinating his secular learning to Christian purposes.
Just as Augustine sought to place the seductive brilliance of classical culture in proper perspective, so did he seek to minimize his own and others' personal pride in intellectual virtuosity. In the
Confessions, indirectly quoting from the Gospel of John, he writes of his own efforts at exegesis:
Let us go on, 0 Lord my God, to explain the meaning which the next verse of your Scripture holds
for me. I shall speak without fear, for if you inspire me to give the meaning which you have willed
me to see in these words, what I say will be the truth. If any other than you were to inspire me, I do
not believe that my words would be true, for you are the Truth, whereas every man is a liar, and for
this reason he who utters falsehood is only uttering what is natural to him, what is his alone. If, then
I am to speak the truth, let me utter not what is mine, but what is yours. (Book XIII, Section 25)

Here, as elsewhere, Augustine is reminding his readers that their efforts and talents do not create
the Truth, which vastly exceeds their understanding. At best, they may hope to bring their minds
and learning to the service of elucidating that truth for others.
Augustine lived during a period in which the elite could still take classical education and learning
as a predictable aspect of life. But the growing pressure of the barbarian invasions as manifested in
the sack of Rome was beginning to mount a serious threat to centers of classical learning and to the
value of the cultural enterprise it represented. Nor, we must confess, can the situation have been
helped by Christians' sincere doubts about the value of any learning that did not overtly glorify
God. In any society and any generation, the transmission of culture and learning require an effort
that is too difficult to undertake without a deep commitment to the intrinsic value of both. During
the final days of the Roman Empire, there seem to have been a disproportionate number of people
who, when reflecting upon even the most elegant secular learning, were asking themselves, "What
is it for and what is it about?" This was not a climate in which Varro's vision of the liberal arts was
likely to flourish, and, increasingly with the passage of years, it did not.
We now know that the so-called "dark" ages that succeeded the disintegration of the Empire
were nowhere near as dark as they were once painted as being. It remains nonetheless indisputable
that, from roughly the fifth to the twelfth centuries, secular learning, and the system of education
that might have helped to perpetuate it, suffered an appreciable decline, with the result that,
throughout the Western province of the former Empire, now barbarian kingdoms, old schools or
centers of learning declined and closed. As towns and trade also declined and the majority of the
population retreated to the land, the most obvious uses for a literate education also diminished,
and the general level of cultural and intellectual sophistication spiraled downward. These were the
centuries during which Christians emerged as custodians of the classical legacy and during which
they gradually assumed primary responsibility for whatever educational program emerged. It would
be centuries before secular educational institutions remerged and slowly regained predominance.
In this perspective, we may safely claim that Christianity decisively influenced the development of
educational institutions and programs in Western Europe and the United States. What we may not
so easily claim is that Augustine's preferred Christian intellectual attitudes and habits of mind have
survived the triumph of secular modernism.
As early as the beginning of the third century AD, Tertullian perceived that the great challenge
for Christian scholars and intellectuals lay in finding and sustaining a proper balance between faith
and reason. Presumably Tertullian's frustration at the magnitude of the challenge provoked his
query about the relation of Athens to Jerusalem. In practice, Tertullian abandoned neither his
learning nor his Christianity, according to Colish, although about 206 or 207 he did embrace the
Monatist heresy, which may have resulted in his growing rigidity about Christian doctrine and
impatience with pagan culture, especially philosophy. (Stoic Tradition 10) None of his greatest sue-

cessors seems to have experienced the tension as acutely, although they were demonstrably conscious of it. Apparently, St. Ambrose was the only one to have escaped the sense of personal conflict
and to have had no interest in proving "the inferiority of philosophy to the Gospel" or in synthesizing philosophy with the Gospel. As Marcia Colish has noted, Ambrose's writings do not "reveal
the slightest need to agonize or to fulminate over the relation between Athens and Jerusalem." In
writing of ethics, which remained his principal interest, he drew freely upon the Stoics, but never
settled for imitation, even of Cicero, his hero. (50-51)
St. Jerome represents yet another response to the challenge of integrating pagan learning and
Christianity. Widely reputed to be the greatest humanist among the Latin Fathers, Jerome was something of an amateur in philosophy. His great strengths lay in literature, and it is in relation to literature that he presented his problem in reconciling the pagan classics with Christianity. In terms reminiscent of Tertullian, Jerome presents his famous dream in which God judges him and casts him
into outer darkness for being a Ciceronian. Jerome, in his Epistula (22.29. 7, in Colish 70-71), subsequently frames the problem in the rhetorical question: "Quid facit cum psalteria Horatius? Cum
evangelis Maro? Cum apolstolo Cicero?" ("What has Horace to do with the Psalter, Virgil with the
Gospels, Cicero with Paul?") But the anxieties that Jerome describes do not interfere with his attachment to the classics, which retains a distinctly literary rather than philosophical quality. His appreciation of literary excellence for its own sake and on its own terms has important implications for the
future of liberal arts education, but Jerome clearly does not see it as a serious threat to Christianity
or his own faith. Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine each responded differently to Tertullian's question, but notwithstanding the variations in their responses, none found it possible or desirable to
forgo the resources of classical culture, including pagan philosophy.
Notwithstanding the radical rupture embodied in and effected by the Incarnation and the
advent of the Christian era, there are essential ways in which the Latin Fathers represent the end of
one world rather than the beginnings of another. Born into the classical world, they remained its
progeny even as they paved the way to a post-classical future. As the great scholar Josef Pieper has
written, ''Augustine, his listeners, and his readers were still living completely within the framework
of the Imperium Romanum, in the sphere of Hellenistic thought which had been shaped by NeoPlatonism, the Stoa, and Epicurus. That was their intellectual home" (19). Even Augustine, who
witnessed the barbarians' descent upon Rome and died as they were assailing his own Hippo, did
not personally experience the full force of the transition to the new order-what has commonly
been called the birth of the Middle Ages. Looking to mark that transition precisely, Hegel chose to
locate the official opening of the Middle Ages in 529, the date on which the Emperor Justinian
decreed the closing of the Platonic Academy in Athens. Hegel, who regarded the thousand years
between the closing of the Academy and Descartes as an intellectual wasteland, does not even allude
to the other event that might be taken to distinguish 529, the founding of Monte Cassino, the first
Benedictine monastery, significantly located between Rome and Naples along the high road of the
barbarian migrations. (16-17)
A date such as 529 is only a symbolic marker for changes that originated years earlier and would
continue to swirl years later. But, as a symbol, it serves as well as any to signal the changing of the
intellectual guard and, indeed, the intellectual enterprise itself. By the beginning of the sixth century, the invaders had established their political domination, and the intellectuals, both secular and
clerical, were turning their attention to the preservation of classical texts more than to the continuing development of classical thought. For if the years between the sixth and the seventeenth century were not as benighted as Hegel claimed, those between the sixth and the twelfth centuries have
hardly been known for original contributions to a vital intellectual tradition. What they did contribute was an indispensable work of translation and the first glimmerings of what would emerge as
the Scholastic project to reconcile faith and reason. And what makes their project so interestingand relevant-to our own situation is that rather than developing Classical culture, including philosophy, on its own terms, they sifted through it in an attempt to determine the aspects of it that
would best serve their purposes.
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That project dominated the intellectual life of Western Europe for some six centuries and figured prominently in the founding of the first European universities. In 529, it was little more than
an intention on the part of a few whose lives poignantly embodied the upheavals and dangers of the
transition from the Roman to the barbarian world. Preeminent among those most directly responsible for translating key classical texts and thereby ensuring their survival into the new world was
Boethius, best known as the author of the Consolatio philosophiae, The Consolation of Philosophy.
Although Boethius died a few years before 529, he had attended the Platonic Academy in Athens
and was a distant relation of Benedict of Nursia through the ancient Roman clan of Anicians. The
scion of a Roman senatorial family, he went as a young man to the court of Theodoric the Goth
where he earned rapid advancement and received countless honors. Notwithstanding that extraordinary early success, Boethius' position at the German court remained fraught with contradictions
and dangers: "Roman in the service of the Germanic sovereign; 'Greek' in the sphere of the Christian religion; Catholic among the Arian Goths." Predictably, the tensions of his position as mediator
eventually led to his imprisonment and death, and it was while he was awaiting execution at the
hands of his former patron Theodoric that he wrote the Consolatio.
The historically trained reader can discern a variety of intellectual influences in Boethius' The
Consolation of Philosophy, and the effort may produce any number of useful observations. But as
Pieper acutely notes, "The danger is that it will also prevent the reader from hearing the true voice
of Boethius himself, the vox humana in the book. To reach out to that," he continues, "one must be
left alone with the book. .. and turn the soul's sight and hearing directly upon the actual content.
Only then will the true and literal impact of the Consolatio philosophiae come through: that here
we have a man who has had all the richness of his life's possessions knocked from his hand without
warning, and is now trying to answer the question of what is left to him. Face to face with death,
this man undertakes to secure his last cash in hand." At this point, nothing could be of less concern
to this path breaking scholar and translator than learned citations. As Dr. Johnson would acerbically
remark some dozen centuries later, "Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a
fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully" (Boswell, Sept 19, 1777). Awaiting execution in
Theodoric's cell, Boethius focuses upon the "horribly concrete, life-and-death question of whether
the world and existence have now become meaningless to him-yes or no?" (Pieper 32-33). This is
an eternal question for humanity that cuts to the core of the meaning of life and that can, on any
day, drop unannounced into anyone's life.
The Consolatio, which Boethius never intended to write, remains his best known and most
widely read book. Yet he has other significant claims upon our attention and gratitude. Early on, he
set himself a daunting task of translation, which he announced with breath-taking self-confidence:
"'Ego omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit . . . omnesque Platonis dialogos in
Latinam redigam formam'-'1 shall translate into Latin every book of Aristotle that comes into my
hands, and all the dialogues of Plato's'." (30) Pieper convincingly argues that, beyond sheer quantity, the inestimable value of Boethius' translations lies in his genius in the choice of words, which
continues to influence our basic concepts in ways we do not suspect. It is Boethius who gave us the
words 'subject,' 'speculation,' 'define,' and 'principle,' all of which he selected to coordinate with
the Greek of Plato and Aristotle, each of which brilliantly captures the original's nuances of
meaning. (28)
Boethius' other claim upon our attention derives from his opuscula sacra, small tractates upon
theological subjects. In these writings, which have led to his reputation as the first Scholastic, he
developed a self-conscious program of joining faith to reason. His goal is to write of Christian doctrine and dogma in strictly rational terms in order to "make comprehensible to the rational mind,
the dogma of the One God's Trinitarian nature" (37). One may readily object that this project is far
from novel. Had not Augustine written a great treatise on the Trinity for the same purpose? Yet
Boethius was not simply following in Augustine's footsteps. He was undertaking a genuinely new
project, one that distinguished his work from everything that had come before. (37) The novelty of
this project lay in its purposeful, self-conscious nature and in the rigor with which he carried it out.

He explicitly advocated the need to join faith to reason, and, following his own advice, he wrote of
theological matters without ever resorting to a single citation from the Bible. Logic and analysis
carry the argument. And Boethius' vision and practice of uniting faith and reason dominated
medieval intellectual life until William of Ockham proposed the rival hypothesis: "that belief is one
thing and knowledge an altogether different matter; and that a marriage of the two is neither meaningfully possible nor even desirable" (3 7 -39).
Even as Boethius insisted upon the importance of reason and its accomplishments of learning,
he forcefully disputed the value of learning as mere adornment. Nothing, he maintained, can be
enhanced by adventitious ornament, by which he meant that our possessions and accomplishments
become our own only if we transform them into our own innermost being, for, in the final reckoning, all that counts is what a person 'is,' not what he 'has.' Not every thought we conceive or
every concept that makes up our stock of knowledge really belongs to us. There are innumerable
thoughts and concepts that appeal to our reflective reason and with which we express our formal
agreement that never become truly our own-that never fuse with our sense of self. In exploring
these ideas, Boethius was touching upon one of the core attributes of a liberal education, namely its
role in shaping an innermost sense of self. (34) And it should not be difficult to understand why, in
this spirit, he insisted upon the need to unite faith and reason.
Over the centuries, the unification of faith and reason has increasingly been viewed as problematic, and that for several reasons. The modern world has ever more inclined to embrace Ockham's
position that faith and reason prevail in separate realms. In the United States and Western Europe
the dominant tendency has held that any mention of faith threatens the integrity of the intellectual-"scientific"-enterprise. It has not always been so. Indeed throughout the nineteenth century
and, in some instances, into the twentieth, religiously grounded moral instruction was widely
accepted as necessary to knowledge and as one of the major aspects of a liberal education. But
increasingly, even those who concurred about the value of moral instruction were likely to view it as
separate from instruction in discrete academic disciplines, especially those that aspired to some
measure of scientific rigor.
Prevailing assumptions about the nature and requirements of scientific rigor, which progressively extended their tentacles into what are now known as the social sciences, proved especially
inhospitable to the union of faith and reason in intellectual work. At least since Descartes, and
arguably since Ockham if not Joachim of Flores, liberal education has been intended to promote the
individual's power to know and to generalize. Even a moment's reflection reveals these goals to be
seriously at odds with Christian virtue, perhaps especially the theological virtues of faith, hope, and
charity. In the first instance, the Promethean emphasis upon the power of the individual mind fosters the illusion that the individual can-and should-displace God as the author of knowledge and
the creator of life. In the second instance, the premium placed upon generalization necessarily
results in a growing tendency to abstract from the particularity of the world. In this perspective, the
wonder of creation reduces to a given number of types or models that capture the elements that different people or communities share, but lose the specificity that makes each of them unique.
Please do not mistake my meaning. I have no desire to promote intellectualluddism, although I
do wonder if a small dose would not occasionally be salutary. One of the main purposes of a liberal
education is to cultivate maturity and independent judgment. As Cardinal Newman eloquently
insists in The Idea of the University, knowledge is a good in and of itself-an intrinsic good that
requires no utilitarian justification. Newman supports his claim with the reminder that Cicero, in
enumerating the various rubrics of mental excellence, lays down the pursuit of Knowledge for its
own sake, as the first of them. One of the main functions of a liberal education, Newman insists, is
to prepare the mind for knowledge by inculcating a habit of mind that lasts throughout a lifetime
and manifests the attributes of "freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom,'' what
Newman has elsewhere called "a philosophical habit" (77).
As a devout Catholic, Newman harbors no illusions about the intrinsic religious value of knowledge: Knowledge may have religious value, but need not. "Knowledge is one thing, virtue is
12113 The Cresset Reformation l2001

another; good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and justness of
view faith. Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman." The
qualities of the gentleman are a fine thing and, in Newman's view, their cultivation justifies the
existence of a University, of which they are the object, but "they are no guarantee for sanctity or
even for conscientiousness." Sanctity and conscientiousness are not the business of liberal education, which, viewed in itself, "is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is
nothing more or less than intellectual excellence." To cultivate the mind is as intelligible as cultivating virtue, but the one project "is absolutely distinct from" the other. (90-91) Athens, it would
seem, has nothing to do with Jerusalem.
Newman did not leave the matter there. He sought to establish theology as the science of sciences, and he argues that religion-specifically Roman Catholicism-should provide the ethos and
framework for education. Many who did not share his religious convictions were very much taken
with his vision of liberal education as an intrinsic good that was otherwise good for nothing else.
Notwithstanding the brilliance and broad appeal of Newman's vision, it was rapidly overtaken by a
series of historical developments that are beginning to look almost as revolutionary for our time as
the barbarian invasions were for the Roman Empire.
Today the vision of the liberal arts faces a host of challenges, notably the rising premium on
the utilitarian value of education, which plays a major role in establishing a young person's economic prospects-what is familiarly known as earnings potential. It would seem that Augustine's
earthly city has triumphed with a vengeance and with a more than ordinary premium on self-love.
This is a climate in which the questions of "what is it for?" and "what is it about?" converge in the
perceived imperative to make money. And under these conditions it becomes ever more difficult to
invite students to reflect upon the meaning of existence without reference to material success.
I do not raise these questions to trash our students, especially since we-their teachers and
parents-are, if anything, more accountable than they. Nor do I intend to join the ranks of those
who sharply criticize the disintegration of a true liberal education under the new barbarian invasions of identity studies in their manifold guises. In fact, there is heartening news that "great
books" courses are enjoying a resurgence, notably among precisely those groups of young people
who were condescendingly assumed to need identity studies. The trend is heartening, and we
may pray it continues, but, in the end, the crisis of liberal education in our time is not really-or
not exclusively-about which books we teach. At stake in the debates are, once again, the great
transformative questions of meaning, and, above all others, the question of what we want education to do. Christians bring a special perspective to these discussions and should be eager to seize
the tide at the flood.
Let me leave you with two parting thoughts. First, the content of a liberal arts education has
never been permanent. The original prescribed kinds of knowledge. Surely some books deserve
and repay serious attention more than others, and I would be loathe to see any student graduate
without having read the Bible and some Shakespeare. But next? Plato or Dante? Aristotle or
Descartes? Second, and ultimately more important, Christians should reflect upon the ethos that
has informed the modernist version of a liberal arts education, which is what most people who
champion liberal education regret. Christians may have good reason to concur with many postmodernist critiques of modernism, although not with postmodernist agendas. Above all, the current crisis in liberal education invites us to reflect upon the ideal of knowledge as a good in itself
and upon the place of non-utilitarian learning in any education.
As Newman suggested, and as countless others have concurred, the value of non-utilitarian
education is great, especially in the measure that it inculcates the habit of reflection upon the human
condition and a disinterested consideration of moral and political problems. As recently as the
early twentieth century, it was taken to constitute the distinguishing mark of the gentleman-and
the lady. But by the time Newman wrote, education in the liberal arts was no longer seen as distinctively Christian, which might prompt contemporary Christian advocates to think about what it is
they are promoting.
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The liberal arts originated as a resolutely secular project. With the collapse of the Roman
Empire, they were appropriated and shaped by the Church, which in much of Europe monopolized
education until the sixteenth century, and even long after the Reformation remained, in both the
Old World and the New, under religious influence and control, but they never completely lost their
this-worldly dimension, which decisively recovered preeminence with the triumph of secular individualism in the wake of the Enlightenment. Following David Hume's disquieting introduction of
systematic skepticism in the early eighteenth century, intellectuals and educators confronted a
growing tension between faith and reason that inescapably informed people's changing understanding of the liberal arts.
The growing retreat from requirement of the classical languages further complicated the issue by
opening the possibility of choice in the selection of texts to be studied, and the growing sophistication of modern science increasingly liberated education in science from the purview of the liberal
arts. As a result, the defense of the liberal arts came more and more to consist in the defense of Shakespeare, Dante, and Goethe-or whomever-as against Frederick Douglass, Kate Chopin, and Alice
Walker-or their equivalents-which opened defense of the liberal arts to charges of being reactionary. Above all, however, the last half-century has witnessed a mounting attack upon Christianity
in the classroom, which has encouraged those who defend the liberal arts to do so in secular terms.
The current crisis in education offers many reasons for concern, although it seems increasingly
plausible that growing numbers of parents are actively seeking a liberal arts education for their children. On a less encouraging note, many above all seek an education that prepares their children to
earn as much money as possible, and nothing could be further from their minds than non-utilitarian
education as an intrinsic good. However great the complexities of this picture, and they are great,
we may be sure that they open new opportunities for Christians to develop their own vision of a liberal arts education. And this is an opportunity we should be foolish not to seize with both hands.
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The Shaper
Walter Wangerin, Jr.

part one: forged in relationship
When our children were young it was my custom to tell them stories in the dark, in their bedrooms, in the tender, dreamish warmth before they fell asleep. I sat in a chair tipped back on its hind
legs. The children lay tucked beneath their covers. I smoked. I have since quit; but in those days I,
the tale-teller and their father, smoked a pipe whose aroma (I hoped) would ever thereafter attend
their memories of-could possibly even trigger their memories of-those holy, communal moments
and the murmurous music of my voice.
I made the stories up, most often right there on the spot.
I shaped the stories to fit their days and each their individual personalities. Every child became
the hero of his and her own story-though the names were changed and the settings were mostly at
some safe distance from the grit world around us.
For an entire season, once, I raveled out in nighttime episodes a longish tale about Orphay and
Dice. It was loosely based on the myth of Orpheus, whose beloved Euridice had descended into
the underworld, Hades, the land of the dead, after being fatally wounded by a snake. There the
King of the Dead, also named Hades, ruled with his queen, Persephone. Orpheus, who was
imputed to have introduced music to the world, the sweetness of whose music could turn a dead
tree green again, begged to descend into Hades in order to bring his beloved up to sunlight and life
again. Orpheus played music so sweet, the whole of the underworld was moved-even coldhearted Hades. "Yes," said Hades, "she may go with you-but only so long as you do not turn to
see if she is following!" And the treachery of so seeming-easy a task is, of course, that Euridice
made no sound in the following. Orpheus had no evidence she was there. He had to proceed on
blind faith and faith alone ....
In my version, Orphay and Dice were much younger than in the myth; and rather than Greek,
they were Mrican American, as was the whole culture around us; yet Orphay's power remained in
his music, the drumming, the sound and the subtle rap. For though his brother Matthew was our
black son and he our white, it was Joseph who was the artist, after all, filled with subtlety and sensitivity and remarkable music. This, therefore, was Joseph's story, his naming, and the early enunciation of his purpose in life.
Today he is a sculptor, still the artist whom I had shaped by story.
But I never wrote that story down.
Sometimes I would, as it were, toss a story out to all the children, just tell the tale until it found
its ending (for it is usually the story that takes me along for the ride rather than I the story). If none
of the four children asked to hear it again, then that was the end of its life. The tale had served its
purpose, and then had passed away. There was no sorrow nor any loss in that: stories take up their
existence always in relationship. It is the relationship that endures, affected deeply or lightly by the
tale, which is its servant. The effect remains as a characteristic of the relationship. (It cannot be the
other way around, that relationships serve an artist's art, a writer's craft, for then the writer has
begun to worship his talent and his vocation, and his art can become the god that consumes the
people around him. This is dangerous and destructive.)
On the other hand, one of the children might ask to hear that story again. And again. And then
I knew that she had made it her own: it nursed some internal hunger within her; and with every
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telling the story was reshaped not just by my creativity, but also by my child's tiny responses, sighs,
gestures, words, dialogues, demands, requests, exclamations, giggles, refusals. For this is the way it
has always been with the best of story-tellers: what they utter is also forged in relationship. The
thing is born and re-born in community. It is the moves of an intricate dance, requiring the taleteller to be as alert to his audience as he is to his material.
In this way, for example, the story now published as In the Beginning There Was No Sky actually became my daughter's story, chosen by her and then shaped in the living nexus of our relationship, in our mutual love and trust. Only when she was done with it, her need of it having
passed away; only when she and No Sky had detached from one another, did I tell it to others (to
adults, in fact) and discover in their strong emotional responses how universal was the particular
need of my daughter. Then, therefore, on account of the mute assent of the broader community, I
chose to write the story down and offer it in print to the public. And though I cannot know the
many who have read it since, yet it is my conviction that by means of this story we have, writer and
readers, compacted together an enduring relationship: spiritual, if not physical; in the fictive place
and time of the tale itself, if not in the fiercely fixed dimensions of "real" time and space.
Often the seed of an evening story came from the children themselves, some childish
metaphor they may have used during the day, which I would then have taken seriously and permitted to become the controlling image of the entire story. In that case I became for them not
much more than a sophisticated mirror, reflecting in large the thought they had produced in
small and in a flash.
For example, Talitha, the youngest of our children, once said to me: "Daddy, your work eats
you up, doesn't it?"
I was a pastor in those days. I was good. I mean, as a pastor I had to be good the day long; but by
the time I came home, I was often wearied by my well-doing-and no longer good. I griped. I was
impatient. I could utter thunder in my judgments. And I, like the storm, could chase my children
inside-inside themselves, away from me.
But Talitha explained it, by the indirection of her metaphor, much in my favor: ministry consumed me. Your work eats you up.
Now, rather than peer through the metaphor to some simple, propositional interpretation of it
(which must, finally, diminish all that is implied in such a rich figure of speech) the story-teller
accepts it as is; blows a fuller life into it, so that it becomes not a single figure but an entire fantasy;
and allows it to represent (in the experience of story) much more than his poor discursive mind
could ever comprehend on its own.
I turned it into a story.
I allowed the major character to manifest characteristics of Talitha herself. She cried much
when we first adopted her. And her tears embarrassed her, drew the mockery of her three siblings.
But her tears, I sincerely believed, were born as well of tenderness (not only of vulnerability, but
also of a watchful sympathy).
So the story was about a potato farmer and his wife, who had four children: Pine, the oldest
and full of pride as a problem-solver; Oak, all full of pride in his physical aptitude; Rose, all full of
pride in her beauty (in succession recognizable as Joseph, Matthew, and Mary); and Thistle, who
cried all the time, at which her siblings sneered, "Oh, Thistle, can you do nothing but cry? No,
nothing but cry."
Near the beginning of the story, the farmer uncovers a potato twice as big as he is himself,
whose thousand eyes, one by one, pop open!
The potato begins to talk.
"My name is Pudge!" it roars. "I'm hungry! I'm hungry and ready to eat! And here is my dinner
before me. Man, I'm going to eat you!"
Which is exactly what the potato does: eats the potato farmer, "shoes, shovel and all."
Grim? Indeed. But not grimmer than my daughter's metaphor-and fantastic enough that it
remains a figure at several removes from "real" life.
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As the story continues, Pudge swallows down, one by one, the whole family, till Thistle is left
alone. And crying. But those tears become the salvation of the whole family, because her kindness
allows an old crone to kiss them, at which each tear becomes a thorn-and when Pudge swallows
her down, she sticks and stabs his gullet until he bursts open and the whole family emerges, now
dancing gladness around the youngest child of all, Thistle-for they have been saved by her love,
saved from their father's work, which had eaten everyone else up.
Now, this is the same method I followed in the development of the story that precedes this
essay: "The Resurrection of Karen McDermott." Its formative process is something of a reversal
upon the method used for "Lily." In "Lily" the author makes up the controlling metaphor and offers
it to the children in service of their need. In "Thistle" and in "Karen McDermott," however, the
author finds the controlling metaphor already in use by the child, where it is already accomplishing
a highly complex service for the child. (Karen affects indifference by investing her more sensitive
self in a secret and separate object, as other children place their truest attentions, their fundamental
loyalties in, say, a hobby, or a hidden and protected place, a pet, some self-affirming fantasy.) The
author's job, then, is merely to give that metaphor latitude and sequence, space and time, for larger
growth and a deeper investigation. As long as the metaphor remains intact-not analyzed, not interpreted, but only expanded-it continues to serve and to nurse in ways beyond the story-teller's
capacity ever to comprehend. (Ever and ever, our stories should be smarter than we are, or else they
might as well be lessons, teachments, preachments, instructions limited to our poor intellects.)
By this method, once more, the story is born in the relationship between a watchful artist and
his watching audience.
It is an intense communion.
And I, as a story-teller, am for my child, for my congregation, for my community, for the public
at large .. .I am the Shaper.
part two: story and history, shaping the day
During the Renaissance, poets delighted in the Greek sense of that word poet. Ben Jonson (in
Timbers) defines it as "the maker." The poet was perceived as a creator not unlike the Primeval Creator of All.
But I personally find its older, Sanskrit meaning much more congenial to the task I think I do.
The Sanskrit cognate, cinoti, makes of the poet "a heaper into heaps, and a piler into piles."
We artists, we writers-we come upon the stuff of our crafty attentions already there. But we
find it a mess. Hopeless. A meaningless chaos. Our job is to organize. To order. To heap certain
things with certain things over here, and to pile other things over there. To declare associations and
differences and relationships. To make of this chaos a cosmos, which we do by translating things
into language, and language into character and episode, and episodes into whole stories. Under our
craft, time is no longer a series of endlessly repeated ticks. For every tick we offer a tack. For every
beginning, a palpable and satisfying end. An "end," that is, a purpose, a value, a "point to which" all
these piled-up things do tend, and in which they may be fulfilled.
Our poems are that order. Our songs and our stories do more than persuade others that an
order exists: they build the house; they weave a world; they companion our listeners into the experience of such ordered cosmos.
Another ancient word: the Old English word which is translated as poet today, is Scop. It's pronounced "shop." And it is the ancestor of our present word: Shape.
Our forebears knew that the task of the minstrel, of the community's tale-telling singer, was to
sing amorphous, overwhelming events into shape.
Let's say, for example, that a seventh century community has just fought a day's battle with
their nearest enemy. Hand-to-hand they fought until the dark descended with forces more frightening than any human could be. The battle had been bloody enough to make a red mud of the earth
beneath their feet; and one of their number had died; and now they've returned to the mead hall,
exhausted, hungry, aggrieved.
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They eat in silence. They drink that oldest of human drinks, a wine made of fermented honey.
Their sadness deepens to a maudlin despair... .
And just then the singer strikes a chord on his harp.
Everyone listens.
The singer develops the chord into melody. A familiar melody, in fact. One everyone has heard
since childhood, and therefore one that carries profound, unutterable associations: parental comfort, an assurance of the divine. The singer sings familiar verses, and all the people nod: there is the
weight of meaning in these verses. They remember. They remember and re-experience them now.
But then the singer begins to weave new words into the familiar verses: the details of today's
grim battle; the name of the comrade who fell; the deeds he did in falling, all of which, fetching up
in the experience of this song, find place within the precincts of the divine; all of which are no
longer senseless, but do bear now the weight of genuine purpose and meaning. And the people nod.
And the dead ascends into the Valhalla of heroes. It is well. Chaos is cosmos. Desolation is now
heavy with purpose. The day has taken shape in the singer's song-and ever thereafter, it is the spiritual, artistic shape which is remembered as the truth of that
day, not the cold, undecipherable, purely empirical fact.
In my day and in my experience as the singer, the song I might sing is the Twenty-Third Psalm.
And the story I tell will always, always have a narrative familiarity to my wounded listeners; its pattern is ever the same. But the details will invite their particular sorrows, their particular persons and
histories, to enter the tale anew. And the power of the old, old story will prop them up in all their
leaning places.
The poet withdraws for the sake of the story.
And the story exists for the sake of relationship.

f
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learning to be a slave

David K. Weber

"Paul, a prisoner for Christ Jesus, and Timothy our brother. ... Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.
For this reason, though I am bold enough in Christ to command you to do your duty, yet I would rather appeal to you on the basis of
love-and I, Paul, do this as an old man, and now also as a prisoner of Christ Jesus. I am appealing to you for my child, Onesimus, whose
father I have become during my imprisonment . ... " (from the Letter of Paul to Philemon)

I

faintly «call my high school class chw as "something something we are free' We'« the
class of '73." Only once a decade can a class rally around this particular expression of the desire to
be free. Consider this desire for freedom in the slightly higher artistic genre of country music. [Cole
Porter as country music? I don't think so. Ed.] [But if the song was sung by Willie Nelson and it is
not "country," then it must be "western." DKW]
Give me land, lots of land under starry skies above.
Don't fence me in.
Let me ride through the wide open country that I love.
Don't fence me in.
I want to ride to the ridge where the west commences.
Gaze at the moon until I lose my senses.
Can't look at hobbles and I can't stand fences.
Don't fence me in.

Who would believe
that this sermon was

Or consider the cry of the American revolution, "Give me liberty or give me death!" as it proclaims
that life without freedom is not worth living. Finally, a recent book on Luther's theology declares,
"Freedom is the central feature of the Christian life."
Still, our desire for freedom must face up to the reality of our human experience, where choices
have nothing to do with what happens to us. We do do not choose our births, we do not choose our
deaths, and we do not choose when we will or will not be stricken with disease or catastrophe. In so
many of the most important events in our lives, our freedom does not matter. It may be that the
to be a slave. When the philosopher Josef
lesson we most need to learn is not to be free but how
I
Pieper considered the virtue of courage, he argued that we make a fundamental mistake in thinking
that courage is first and foremost exemplified in the vigorous and valorous actions in battle. He
wrote, "It is one of the fundamental laws of a world plunged into disorder by original sin that the
uttermost strength of the good manifests itself in powerlessness." I think it is necessary for the
church to rethink freedom.
A good place to start this rethinking is with Paul's letter to Philemon, where of the three main
characters Paul is a prisoner of Jesus Christ, Onesimus is a runaway slave who awaits extradition,
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Yet it is so.
Thank God for our
prophets.
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and only Philomon is fm to oxO<ciso his will. Mo<Oom, in this mhinking, I will not •ddms
is problematic in Paul's view of slavery, but rather focus on the book's greeting, where Paul, selfdescribed as "a prisoner of Jesus Christ," declares that it is not freedom but imprisonment which is
at the core of his identity.
It would appear that, as much as Paul writes about freedom, and as much as the Reformation is
built on the notion of freedom, freedom is not of first importance. Perhaps the Exodus of Israel
from Egypt provides a pattern for our thinking, namely that, in order to think rightly about the
freedom in the Promised Land, we must first consider what it meant to survive the slavery in Egypt
and the arduous task of coming to grips with this freedom in the journey through the wilderness.
A right understanding of freedom requires that we first learn to be slaves; persons whose lives are
dictated and determined by the will of others. "It is one of the fundamental laws of a world plunged
into disorder by original sin that the uttermost strength of the good manifests itself in powerlessness."
Who more than prisoners and slaves can teach us what we need to know about powerlessness?
In the Freshman Core class, we have just finished reading Narrative of the Life of a Slave by
Frederick Do uglass. Although the most frequently cited passages concern Douglass' moving
accounts of the cruelty of slavery and his insatiable desire for freedom, if I am to learn to be a slave,
I need to know how Douglass endured his slavery without losing hope. In one passage Douglass
suggests that the slaves' hope was sustained by song writing: "While on their way, [they] would
make the dense old woods ... reverberate with their wild songs, revealing at once the highest joy and
the deepest sadness .... They would sometimes sing the most pathetic sentiment in the most rapturous tone, and the most rapturous sentiment in the most pathetic tone." One example is the popular camp song, "Do Lord, oh do Lord, do you remember me?" Why put such a despairing question: "Lord, have you also forgotten me?" to such a peppy tune? One answer is that truth mattered
to sustaining the hope of the slave. Living in an environment which punished the expression of
truth, song was a subversive way to communicate the truthfulness of both their sorrow and stubborn refusal to abandon hope. Douglass continues:
I have sometimes thought that the mere hearing of those songs would do more to impress some
minds with the horrible character of slavery, than the reading of whole volumes of philosophy on
the subject could do .... Those songs deepen my hatred of. . .the soul-killing effects of slavery. The
songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching
heart is relieved by its tears.

From the slave's perspective, Douglass was able to see a truth that escaped even the most humane
and generous of slave owners. Perhaps the most poignant passage treating the damaging effects of
slavery is Douglass' description of the de-formation of Sophia Auld, the woman who first taught
him to read:
The fatal poison of irresponsible power... soon commenced its infernal work. That cheerful eye,
under the influence of slavery, soon became red with rage; that voice, made all of sweet accord,
changed to one of harsh and horrid discord; and that angelic face gave place to that of a demon ....
Slavery proved as injurious to her as it did to me .... Under its influence, the tender heart became
stone, and the lamb-like disposition gave way to one of tiger-like fierceness.

This passage clues us in to the secret of Douglass' hope: he discovered the "liberal arts" which
literally means the arts of the free person. At every moment a slave was faced with the decision
either to submit or to refuse to let outer circumstances destroy inner freedom. The secret of resistance to becoming what Frankl calls "the plaything of circumstance" was essentially the liberal arts.
Douglass did not have the benefit of a formal education, but in learning to read words, he learned
to read reality for what it really was and to express it in writing. The liberal arts allowed him to distinguish truth from lies and creatively (if not subversively) express it to others. Douglass could see
that they were telling lies about who he was, and he could say in words, "Do not believe them!"
Because slavery had shackled his body, his soul and mind had to work ever harder at being free. "It
is one of the fundamental laws of a world plunged into disorder by original sin that the uttermost
20
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strength of the good manifests itself in powerlessness." I should never wish slavery on anyone. Still,
that Douglass' slavery was responsible for the beauty and insight of his narrative supports Pieper's
remarkable insight into the goodness that is manifested and discovered in powerlessness. This goodness is at the heart and center of Jesus' command to take up our cross and follow him.
We too are continually faced with a decision to either become the "plaything of circumstance"
or to be free. When Paul looked at the shackles that bound him he did not say that he was a prisoner
of Rome but of Jesus Christ. Rome forged the steel, smithed the locks, and held the keys. But finally
Paul understood that he was a prisoner because of the will of the One who gave his life for others by
taking up his cross, and, when he commanded his disciples to take up their crosses and follow, he
made clear his will to give his disciples to others in the same way. Paul did not see himself as a prisoner of Rome but of the one who told him to take up his cross and follow. Imprisonment was the
cross that confronted Paul with a decision. Would he be the "plaything of circumstance" and be
beaten down by that cross or would he, in the hope of the resurrection, actively "take up" and "lift
high" the cross. More needs to be said about this distinction. A cross is simply that instrument of
death. Your cross is that which is killing you. It may be your circumstances, shortcomings, a bad
decision made by another person, a natural disaster, an act of terrorism, bad luck or even the result
of your own willful stupidity. It doesn't matter: your cross is the thing that is killing you and that
you are powerless to do anything about. It is that which confronts you with the decision; will it beat
you down or will you, in your freedom, take it up? Everything depends on your point of view of the
cross of Christ.
I want to consider two alternatives to taking up rather than buckling under the weight of the
cross. The first comes from a slave, Epictetus, who, in his Discourses ponders the secret of life
saying, "Let others study cases at law, let others practice recitations and syllogisms. You learn to
die." Epictetus was a stoic who would say that the secret of life is to endure your cross. This is an
almost Christian answer. Yet, I want to stress that Jesus instructed us to take up the cross because it
is the specific location where grace transforms death into life. Jesus is no stoic who simply endured
the cross. Rather, he joyfully took up his cross, transforming it from a sign of Roman imperial control to a sign of God's liberating grace. The truthfulness of this mystery is depicted in a sculpture
called The Fourth Nail. In addition to the three nails that, on the face of things, held Jesus to the
cross, there is the fourth nail, love, that is really what held him there. It was the fourth nail that
transformed the cross from instrument of torture to a sign of love. The fourth nail makes sense of
the strange words from the writer to the Hebrews: "looking to Jesus ... who for the sake of the joy
that was set before him endured the cross" (12:2). It is Jesus' cross that makes it possible to lift high
the very thing that is destroying us and which we are powerless to stop.
So what is it that's killing you? Paul's greeting is a refusal to let the grief of his imprisonment
break his spirit. His chains were not a sign of the victory of the tear-veiled reality of a dis-integrated
broken world. His bondage was a sign of the same love that held Jesus to the cross. It is significant
that for Paul then, the first characteristic of love is patience, the ability to remain hopeful even when
we are helpless. It is the ability to learn to become slaves. "It is one of the fundamental laws of a
world plunged into disorder by original sin that the uttermost strength of the good manifests itself in
powerlessness." Powerlessness is not hopelessness. Your cross may render you powerless; it will not
destroy you. You are to take up, rather than be beaten down by, this cross because it will lead you
into the deep mystery of that goodness which is grace. He who commands you to take up your cross
and follow him also said that he would send out his followers as "sheep among wolves" which seems
suicidal at best. It is sure defeat, unless, that is, you live in a world where the Lamb of God took up
his cross, and thereby has taken away the sin of the world. That is, in fact, the world in which you
live. "It is one of the fundamental laws of a world plunged into disorder by original sin that the uttermost strength of the good manifests itself in powerlessness.,,
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TESS
Dog.
Brown dog in the dirt.
Pig-ear after supper
and reburied bone after that.
Your flank is beautiful
as you sprawl,
smiling mouth of dewlaps
an d dark whiskers.
Your eyes reflect leaves
and earthworms;
hours go by without a sign or sound
that you have issues
or agendasjust brown dog, chocolate labpapers and xrays proving your parents
and grandparents and when and why(your heritage is far richer than mine)
framed and on the wall where you never look.
Feather ears drape easily on your classic head
that lies in the soft dirt you seem to loveyour bath last week long forgotten,
fleas on short vacationand the expensive dogloo with cushion and blanket
empty in the backyard
as you slumber on, old dirt dog;
and I look at you, wondering how you do it.
Wondering what I can give up.
We watch each other, quiet, content,
and I think of Adam naming the beasts
and pausing at the name, DOG, smiling,
and how they must have walked the shores
of Paradise
watching the brilliant skies called sunset
burst into beauty,
and sat down together, there on the dirt,
happy in Eden.

J. T. Ledbetter
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can liberalism be totalitarian?

Robert Benne

In the mid seventies officials from the Office
of Equal Opportunity encouraged a bus driver
to bring suit against Roanoke's Shenandoah
Baptist Church and its school for paying "heads
of households" more than non-heads. It was not
a case of gender discrimination because if a
woman were the head of a household she
received higher pay also. The church and school
are of a fundamentalist Christian persuasion and
thought they were following the New Testament
literally when they set up such a pay scale. But
the feds saw it differently and engaged in a
eleven-year litigation with the church and school
to bring it to "justice." Finally, after thousands
of dollars paid out by the fundamentalists to
counter the near inexhaustible resources of the
Justice Department, they wearily decided to
settle for a three hundred thousand dollar fine!
One could scarcely believe that such a thing
could happen in our country. But it did. A local
congregation that thought it was doing the
Lord's will was forced by the Justice Department
to conform to liberal notions of justice. There
are many examples of this liberal over-reach.
The Boy Scouts came within one vote of the
Supreme Court of losing their freedom to select
their leadership according to their own criteria.
The Salvation Army was forced to pull out of
San Francisco because they will not bow to local
non-discrimination laws that would force them
to employ persons whose actions violate their
moral convictions. Colleges and universities that
accept, even indirectly, any kind of federal
money have to submit to quota-like gender
equity requirements in their athletic programs,
among other things. Larger schools employ full
time "compliance" officers to make sure they
follow the federal formulae. Any essentially pri-

vate organization that interfaces with the public
can be forced to alter its membership requirements. The long arm of liberal justice even
reaches into family life and prescribes what kind
of parental punishment of children is allowed. I
fear that this interventionism will soon be
applied to religious organizations, making them
comply with the "just policies" that secular liberalism has legislated.
Abroad, the European Union is fast prescribing bureaucratic guidelines for all sorts of
private life, extending from stringent laws that
are running small butcher shops out of business
to laws prescribing the exact size of condoms.
As in the United States, liberal intervention into
private economic life has prepared us for intervention into military and associationallife, even
family life.
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These liberal interventions seem to follow
from three contested-and, in my view, faultyprinciples of justice. First, liberalism holds to a
doctrine of individual rights that can be used as
a razor against any private organization or tradition. That doctrine came into play against
Shenandoah Baptist. The individual's right to
equal pay for equal work trumped the privately
held notion that those financially responsible for
families should receive more pay. It also came
into play against the Boy Scouts. The individual
right to be an atheist and to practice homosexual
relations was held by a number of lower courts
to preempt the Boy Scouts long-held requirements that members believe in God and uphold
traditional sexual ethics. These rights might also
be exercised against faith-based organizations
who provide social services in the new initiatives
being proposed by President Bush.
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A second principle is that of equality of
results. The older notion of equality of opportunity has gradually been displaced by the
modern liberal notion of equality of results. It
is not enough to make the race for social goods
fair and equal, it is now necessary to fix the
results of the race. This generally means that
the composition of any enterprise, private or
public, should reflect the composition of the
surrounding membership or population. This
scarcely veiled system of group rights, strangely
at odds with the liberal doctrine of individual
rights, means that "excluded" groups must be
represented in a mathematically proportionate
manner in whatever enterprise to which this
principle is applied. This doctrine is at work in
the Title 9 laws that are applied to college and
university athletic programs. It has also sustained the "set aside" programs in business as
well as university admissions quotas, both of
which are now under fire by the courts.
The third principle that has invaded the private sphere is that of unlimited accountability.
By that I mean that accountability for actions
has been diminished by those immediately
involved in them and extended exponentially to
all those remotely or indirectly involved in those
actions. Applied in the economic sphere, this has
meant class action suits against many firmspharmaceutical, medical, tobacco, automobile-that have sometimes resulted in the bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy of those firms. In the
sphere of society, it has meant litigation against
persons whose responsibility for a harmful
action is remote, to say the least. A bishop friend
of mine was subject to litigation in four different
cases of sexual harrassment that had occurred in
local parishes before he was bishop! Many professionals live in fear of the consequences of this
kind of unlimited accountability.
ii. The concrete examples listed above-generated by those three principles-illustrate a
disturbing tendency of modern liberal regimes
to impose their definitions of justice on the
private sphere. They clearly pertain to the distinction that H annah Arendt made between
tyrannical and totalitarian regimes. Tyrannical
regimes try to control the public life of a
nation while totalitarian regimes try to destroy
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independent associationallife and replace it
with their own instruments of education and
mobilization. She argued in her Origins of
Totalitarianism that Nazi and Marxist-Leninist
regimes offer clear illustrations of this phenomenon.
I am certainly not arguing that the United
States or the European countries are falling into
totalitarianism, but I am suggesting that their
liberalism is exhibiting a growing tendency to
intervene in private associational life and
thereby destroy the freedoms essential to pluralist democracy. Several major theorists have
noticed this tendency. John Gray, in The Two
Faces of Liberalism, contrasts two kinds of liberalism, each with its own notion of tolerance.
The first kind, Gray argues, assumes that there
is one ideal of "the right" and that all reasonable persons will reach this conclusion, which
then is ensconced in law. Once a consensus
among the reasonable is reached, that notion of
right can and ought to be imposed universally.
Tolerance is offered only in those areas in which
the right has not yet been decided. This vision
was elaborated by Locke and Kant, says Gray.
The second kind, associated with thinkers like
Hume and Hobbes, has less confidence in
reason and people who claim to be reasonable.
It is a "multiple-ideal" philosophy that tolerates many notions of the right and good in private life-among the parts, as it were-while
holding to only a few procedural notions for
the whole.
A concern similar to Gray's is articulated
by Nancy Rosenblum in her book, Membership
and Morals. Rosenblum is worried that groups
without the kind of "morals" favored by the
liberal establishment will not only be denied
membership in society but actually be persecuted. She ponders hard cases such as the
Davidians led by David Koresh and the many
militia groups that have popped up in our
society. Most of these groups hold notions that
are repugnant to an "enlightened liberalism."
Yet, she believes, a liberal society ought to be
tolerant of these groups as long as they don't
directly harm others. She opts for a genuine
pluralist liberalism, not the monist type that
seems to be creeping into our current life. What
is individual freedom without social freedom?

iii. This monist-or totalitarian?-liberalism justifies the over-reach that disturbs me. But a thorough-going pluralism seems to move toward libertarian notions of politics and society, with little
concern for a common good. However, if I had
to choose between them, I'd go for the latter.
People who have too much confidence in their
own rational principles of what is right are all
too easily tempted to interfere in the civic liberties of others who may appear "irrational," and
therefore unjust. Such an insight was articulated
memorably in William Buckley's remark that he
would rather be governed by the first hundred
names in the Boston telephone directory than by
the Harvard faculty.

However, I don't think the only choices we
have are an interventionist liberalism on the one
hand or a libertarian liberalism on the other. It
seems to me that we can avoid either by opting
for a principled pluralism in which all partiesprivate and public alike-are invited into a thoroughly democratic conversation in which we try
to find the overlapping consensus that can provide a substantive ethic for the common good.
Thus, while the freedom of the private sphere is
amply honored, a principled pluralism also has
the promise of constructing a public philosophy
for the whole that exhibits many shared meanings and values. f
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Robert Siegel

DEER TICK
.. .no larger than the period at the end of this sentence.
-The Milwaukee Journal
No larger than a period I scramble
among the sequoia of your armhairs
unable to decide in this vast wilderness
where to drill for the life-giving well
the water of life, the warm blood. For I
am sick unto death, in my abdomen
the spirochete turns its deadly corkscrew
which I must shortly confess to the stream
pulsing from your dark red heart,
setting at liberty this ghostly germ
large in the sickness of the deer's glazed eye
and the mouse's tremble. I carry it for generations
like a secret so long in the family
no one remembers where it came from,
like a small hiatus in the genetic code,
or a choice, an act, a curse
set loose in an ancestor's youth:
a prodigal gone to a foreign city to prosper
and return with mercenaries and fire.
I carry this secret like the memory of a war,
of an evaporated nation, of a people
turned to haze on the horizon
which recedes as one drives toward it, an elusive
virus that lies dormant
and then imitates every other plague
while it maneuvers toward the final crisis:
this telltale shape that one day may fall
over your shoulder into the morning mirror.
This voice that comes in the pit of night
when all the others are still
and tells you precisely what you feared,
what you cannot shrug off, what repeats itself
on smaller and smaller tapes:
0, yes, let me tell you, I will tell you
gladly. Here, I put my mouth closer,
so close I won't need to whisper.

Robert Siegel
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too much and not enough

James Combs

One of the motives for studying popular culture, especially in its American form, is surely
reformist. A standard justification for a course
on popular culture is that such knowledge will
alert students to aesthetic standards by which to
evaluate pop fare, thus learning how to select
and enjoy the best, and how to make critical
judgements about what is being expressed.
However, a Reformation issue should remind us
that injunctions to the reform of anything are
fraught with dangers and difficulties. With the
spirit of reform whirling out of his control,
Martin Luther warned in one of his Wittenberg
sermons of 1522: "Do not suppose that abuses
are eliminated by destroying the object which is
abused. Men can go wrong with wine and
women; shall we then prohibit wine and abolish
women?" As a longtime devotee of both wine
and women, I think Luther's point is well taken.
The Protestant Reformation demonstrates how
the mildest kind of reform movement can arouse
all sorts of actions and reactions far beyond
anyone's intentions or control. So properly chastened with a note of trepidation about suggesting that so many people should change their
way of living, I believe that some modest reforms
of widespread popular habits would make the
United States a better place. We cannot prohibit
and abolish the practices I find objectionable,
but perhaps with a bit of care we can make them
less destructive and offensive.
In some measure, the habits I have in mind
are the consequence-one might even say the
effluvia-of popular sovereignty. In a country
where the individual is sovereign, there develops
a tendency for the individual to exercise the
right to sovereign power with gusto, and for
social forces to develop which cater to the

whims and convergences of popular will. The
consumer economy, for instance, serves us to the
point of our collective bankruptcy. The personal
debt of Americans far exceeds that of public or
corporate debt, but apparently we are determined to fulfill our desires and satisfy our
appetites without much dark thought of the
financial morrow. Habits of overconsumption
are one of the major ways that the individual can
validate self-worth and the right to pursue happiness. We Americans have become the fattest
society on Earth, and despite the entreaties of
dieticians, continue to gorge the body with a vast
array of foodstuffs. Dieting seems to occupy the
same place in our lives as savings accountssomething to be started tomorrow. The sovereignty of the individual does not enjoin the
delay of gratification. Rhetorical conservatism
expends much energy defending such gratuitous
practices (good for business, after all) and puts
reformers and liberals, not to mention economists and doctors, in the position of being
prudes and spoilsports. We may wonder the
extent to which self-gratification can serve as the
basis for a just and lasting political order, since it
seems limited to the principle of unlimited
expansion of the ego for a multitude of discrete
individuals focused on themselves, all suspicious
of restraints of any kind, financial, political, and
personal. Such attitudes and activities do have
consequences, not only for individual behavior
but also for social organization.
Consequently, my first criticism of our popular society is that it overwhelms us with too
much stuff. Consumer sovereignty is the most
obvious manifestation of how we have become
accustomed to the accumulation of stuff. I
recently moved, and became acutely aware of
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the loaves-and-fishes problem-the sheer
amount of stuff I had to deal with: no matter
how much stuff I sold, gave away, threw away,
or simply left, there was still far too much stuff
left to take to the new place. American houses
are larger than most dwellings in other lands,
and the "McMansions" of the rich ostentatiously big. But since worth is measured in how
much stuff we can acquire and store, our places
fill up-closets, garages, attics, storage
lockers-with stuff we little use and have often
forgotten, but nevertheless we keep as evidence
of our self-esteem. Getting rid of stuff, as I had
to do in the move from a big to small place, is
often painful: this stuff is mine, I might use it
someday, and besides if I hang onto it long
enough, it'll become a collectors item. TV's various antique road shows, displaying junk that
turns out to be of value, have no doubt exacerbated our retentiveness. The individual right to
property is no longer based in utility, but rather
in accumulativeness, acquiring things simply
because we can. Perhaps the most singular feature of the postmodern world is the utter pointlessness to which many such activities, from
overstuffed attics to overstuffed Defense
Department budgets, now tend.
This is not to say that we do not use and discard much of our stuff. An indication of our
wealth-worth is displayed in how much stuff we
can throw away. Anthropologists once wrote in
fascination about the tribal chieftains who in the
midst of usual poverty, hosted feasts wherein
great amounts of food were wasted and gifts
thrown away. The practice of "potlatch" has
now been democratized. If we can pride ourselves on how much stuff we can accumulate,
we can also boast of how much stuff we can
pitch. If there are limits as to how much we can
consume, surely there are much greater limits as
to how much we can waste. Acquisition displays
our ability to acquire, while disposal highlights
our ability to dispense, tossing things without
any sense of guilt or loss. By extension, this
ability no doubt includes people and relationships, which are regularly tossed when they have
outlived their usefulness. Defining things as
stuff means that they are desirable as an acquisition, but vulnerable as stuff to be gotten rid of
when deemed of no more interest. (Since this
may seem wildly subversive, I should state my
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own position about property: the old socialists
thought that property is theft; the new capitalists believe that property is sacral; I think that
property is just a damned nuisance.) If everyone
got up tomorrow morning and concluded,
"I don't need all this stuff," the American
System would quickly collapse. Think of how
much daily effort is expended to keep the stuff
moving, including how to get rid of it. There is
a fascinating book entitled Rubbish!: The
Archaeology of Garbage, which recounts the
enormity of what we waste, and the extent to
which archaeologists of the future will judge us
by what we threw away. The potsherds of the
27th century will be styrofoam cups and disposable diapers, not to mention gadgets: it is
astounding how many things we have-dryers,
toaster ovens, TVs, computers, cars-that are
throwaways.
Our undaunted habit of stuffing ourselves
frees us from those restraints from our past that
preached frugality and conservation. The
puritan and Franklinian injunctions to "waste
not, want not," and "a penny saved is a penny
earned" seem to have vanished. Stuff is, after all
the material of happiness, the means of satisfaction, the ornament of pride. Nowadays one
cannot have too much stuff, nor throw too much
stuff away. Moralists and critics have long
stressed that stuff is trivia with which we tranquilize ourselves, and that buying happiness is
an illusion. Wretched excess or not, an American
society recommitted to minimizing waste and
maximizing frugality is hard to imagine.
Secondly, there's too much noise. I mean this
in two senses: there is too much background
noise that interrupts quiet or at least bearable
levels of sound, and there is too much ranting
noise in social discourse, especially mediated
expression. We are all aware of noise inflation in
social life over the past decades-the boom box,
loud mufflers, jet planes, roaring trucks, the
racket of machinery, the blast of music. Some
noise is necessary and even exciting, such as the
din of crowds at sporting events or the loud
bustle of city centers. But often the decibel level
exceeds our capacity to handle it without jagged
nerves, and sometimes the cacophony is even
dangerous. There is evidence that young people
who habitually listen to music at high decibel
levels are courting hearing loss. But even in ordi-

nary life, there is a lot of background noise that
is unnecessary and excessive, not to mention
rude. A major culprit here is the lawnmower
(and its evil partner in crime, the weedeater) .
Most of us have lived around neighbors who cut
grass with obsessive frequency, to the point their
lawns look like putting greens. Grasscutting
often appears to have less to do with the desire
for a superneat yard and more to do with giving
males something to do and getting them out
from underfoot. At this point, the lawnmower
becomes less of a vehicle for respectability and
ownership and more of a way to fill time with
hypnotic repetition. Potentially muted summer
days and evenings where the only sound could
be doves cooing and sheep gently grazing
becomes instead a clangor of mowers in endless
tattoo, lowering lawn grass from one-half to
one-quarter inch high, accompanied by voracious weedeaters with the grating sound of a
dentist drill magnified many times, relentlessly
seeking out upstart dandelions before they grow
into suburban Godzillas violating the sacred
purity of the manicured turf.
If the legions of lawnmower men find grassy
essence in their noisesome quest, the many
voices one can hear in the vast multiplicity of
media outlets expend noise in vehement selfexpression devoid of any identifiable mission
other than momentary exhibitionism. We should
expect this from (for instance) call-in shows who
attract emotive expressions with only occasional
hints of rationality. The great political scientist
Harold Lasswell once defined politics as the
process by which the irrational forces in society
are brought out into the open, and at the
moment nothing does that quite like radio and
TV call-in shows; there are simply lots of people
living angry and often marginal lives, for whom
a few moments venting their wrath with or at an
obliging media host becomes crucial. It can be
argued that we are living in a kind of populistic
Golden Age of democracy, in which not only are
many people highly opinionated, they are determined to find a way of spewing forth for the rest
of us. It is more disconcerting, however, to find
similar aggressive bully-and-bluff and interruptand-insult discourtesy among elite celebrities of
the political class. Like the call-in freaks, the
pundits and ancillary commentary-exhibitors
(how many "former federal prosecutors" do you

know?) seem full of rage and contempt, and are
determined to out-shout or out-insult their
fellow discussants. In fact, there is very little
thoughtful discussion but much assertive selfpromotion; the search is not for options or solutions but rather for the cute quip or the last
word. Such ghastly media talk conjoins the rest
of society, where the mad quest is for the acquisition of more stuff than others; here the quest is
to advance on the word game, as compulsive as
the motorist who simply must get ahead of you
before the road narrows. The glib phrase and the
shouted final assertion becomes a kind of verbal
stuff to acquire and assert, but are just as easily
discarded when no longer operative. Political
talk becomes mere noise, uttered as personal
fury or for careerist motives, but suggests no
belief or action. (It is instructive to listen to the
old radio broadcasts of one of the great Depression demagogues, Father Coughlin, who was
both articulate and serious; now such tiresome
figures as lmus and Limbaugh and O'Reilly are
neither, and so they must rely on noisy tirades
and comic deprecation.) In any case, public noise
increases the trend towards tuning out, and the
only hope of reversal might be those who would
tune in our current president hoping to hear
some new contribution to the dictionary of
malapropisms or puzzlement over zen-like sentences. For many, the noise of the corporate
media resembles the noisemaking of the neighborhood lawnmower freaks, cutting rhetorical
grass for the sheer butchery of it, but without
conviction or purpose. The pointlessness of
mediated discussion is always revealed by the
bonhomie at the end of the show, when everyone
relaxes in media-star fellowship and separates
themselves from what they argued, like a lawn
just cut but now ignored. Making noise apparently does not imply possessiveness, either of
lawns or ideas.
Finally, there's too much speed. We are told
by futuristic oracles such as Alvin Toffler and
James Gleick that the world is now a race
between the fast and the slow and that everything is going faster. We may accumulate much
stuff and find ways to make lots of noise, but
most all of us are beggars before time. Much has
been written about the famous time crunch:
people are so pressed for time that it has to be
rationed, as with parents penciling in "quality

time" with their children. We are all increasingly
aware that virtually everyone is in a big hurry,
and are short on patience. Anyone caught in a
traffic jam or airport backup knows to expect
angry expressions of frustration: I've got to get
where I want to go now. If patience is virtue, we
are totally creatures of vice. Much of the success
of fast-food restaurants is that they guarantee
speed; one can wolf down a burger and fries and
rush off again without relaxation or digestion
or nutrition, all subordinated to the consideration of speed. Waiting, alas, is not our strong
suit, as Miss Manners constantly points out.
Ordinary folks, lured by the speed of it, quit
their steady jobs to become Internet day traders,
making and losing money in the various markets
quickly. I suspect one of the irresistible arguments made by the powerful highway lobby is
that the endless expansion of roads augments
speed, of getting from one place to another
more quickly. Never mind that roadbuilding is
becoming incredibly expensive and destructive
of both communities and environments; since
speed is a good and the wave of the future,
pointless highways are built to nowhere, doing
little but displacing homes, farms, and forests.
But we can proudly go faster to nowhere.
Like acquiring stuff, and making oneself
heard, gaining the means of speed, especially
outspeeding everyone else, gives us a feeling of
power. Firms are constantly upgrading their
computer and communication facilities, on the
premise (now much questioned) that faster is
better because it gives you the thin edge of
advantage. Schools in competition for students
bill themselves as being at the cutting edge of
technology, touting the dubious equation that
students who can access things faster will learn
better. I recently saw an interview with the literary critic Harold Bloom, mourning the triumph of "the screen," and decrying both the
decline of reading and the decay of criticism.
The latter is almost too arcane to evaluate, but
the former is clear enough: more and more
people don't read and claim they don't have time
to read. Reading is after all slow. The fast pace
of popular messages and images supersede the
tedious pace of reading, replacing learning with
informing. We are not illiterate; worse, we are
alliterate, able to read but unwilling to do so. We
gain what we know from those pushing stuff and
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making noise-the most persuasive, the loudest,
the funniest. It is impossible to imagine the president or newsreaders or actors or high-tech
CEOs enduring the many pages of Austen or
Proust or Gibbon or Faulkner; their stock in
trade is the mastery of mediated speed. Like
today's students they often boast about not
reading; we may only surmise whether the corollary is not thinking. The hurry to get stuff and
make noise excludes many activities, from pondering to daydreaming to browsing to reading,
indeed the gamut of those activities we deem
aesthetic, done for their sheer bliss and quality
independent of utility. The habit of hurry robs
us of the capacity for appreciation, and threatens
to enroll us in what Bloom calls "the school of
resentment": how is it that we gain so much, and
make such a fuss, and go so far, and still resent
what we have, or have not, become, often
expressed in envy or malice toward those who
are happy, creative, or just relaxed. (Litcrit, like
punditry, could be peopled by Salieris who hate
the Mozarts who outclassed or at least outranked them; and it is worth pondering that the
two presidents of recent times most despised by
the political class were the thoroughly plebeian
Nixon and Clinton, both devoid of patrician or
at least celebrated credentials, both resented for
their dogged success, and both faced with
impeachment by those who hated them less for
what they did than for who they were.)
The reformer, having pointed out the folly
of contemporary evils, usually concludes with a
peroration enjoining the wicked to come to salvation. Here the injunction calls for less stuff,
more quiet, and slowing down and smelling the
flowers. There are some simple rules to lighten
our lives: when in doubt, don't buy it; turn down
the volume, turn off the bores, and enjoy periods
of relaxed silence and reflection; and cultivate
comfort rather than speed. If there is too much
stuff, there is by contrast too little enjoyment of
simple gifts; if there is too much noise, there is
obversely too little quiet and the spiritual lift
gained by times and places of quietude. (I live
close to the Appalachian Trail: sometimes up
there you can hear Nature's breathtaking symphony without interference.) If there is too
much speed, then there is too little ease. One
heartening sign of redemption: the "slow food"
movement, which began in Italy, aims at

reforming the pace of life so that people not only
eat slowly and well, but also to learn how to enjoy
so many other easily available joys.
Historians and sociologists will no doubt long
ponder how Americans got themselves into a state
wherein so much of life was so joyless, racked
with overstimulation and restlessness and an odd
sense of boredom. Perhaps at core we are not,
simply put, at peace with ourselves. Peace with
oneself is likely a preface to making peace with
others and with the world at large. But amity and
contentment elude us: there is too much to get, to
say, to do. It helps, I think, for us to remind ourselves that peace is something that is made, and
constantly remade over and over again. If we are
at war with ourselves and the world, peace is hard

for us to comprehend, much less seek and find.
But if we could imagine the benefits of peace, we
might find that we have created better people and
a better world. The example of the Protestants of
old should then both inspire and caution us.
Although not always a peaceable lot, their
redeeming thought and ideal was that reform ultimately resides in a change in the human heart
which manifests itself in human habits, in our
time, I fondly hope, towards more civility and
gentility and ultimately, serenity. f
Note: This piece was written before September 11,
the horrific events of which make the quest for
peace all the more remote but also all the more
urgent.

THE DOG WHO LISTENS TO JACK KEROUAC
My daughter tells me her white shepherd
Swallows, with food, one pill each morning
To settle its nerves through another
New York City day. Someone, she says,
Is always outside, drunk or angry
Or loud to themselves on the sidewalk.
While I'm gone, there's traffic, repairmen,
The tenants who shut and open doors.
She named that dog for the white shepherd
In a novel, romantic, perhaps,
Or sentimental, but she tells me,
This summer, the light comes so early,
Her lover rises with the dog's moans
And the tongue that insists on comfort.
That after walks failed, after music
From bluegrass to jazz to the sadness
Of Billie Holliday changed nothing,
He played the voice of Jack Kerouac
Reading from The Subterraneans
And On the Road, the long sentences
Sending her dog back to the light sleep
Of listening, the man she'll marry
Using the oldest home remedy
For anxiety. "Listen, Clem," he says, "good boy,"
The benevolent words of the dead beginning.

Gary Fincke

Pauline Kael

Jennifer Voigt

Jennifer Voigt,
now teaching English
in a Denver high
school, watches
movies and their
reviewers with
a critical eye.
And so she knows
the good ones
when they
come along.

I was thinking about Pauline Kael only a few
hours before I heard of her death. I had been
channel surfing when I came upon "Star Trek II:
The Wrath of Kahn." I hadn't seen it for years,
but I had read a review that Kael gave it, and the
attention and care she gave to writing about it
had impressed me, for before I read what she
had to say, I couldn't see what the movie could
mean to anyone who wasn't a Trekkie. But she
thought it was good fun. She loved Ricardo
Montalban's performance of the title character
and I wanted to see what she had seen in it.
Pauline Kael had an ability to write about movies
and performances that preserved their dignity
while never wavering in what she thought was
good and right about cinema. She was that sort
of critic. She wrote as if all film could be important and her first duty was to find out if it was.
She was never flip about movies, and she never
wrote as if she were better than they or the
people who made them. She wrote as if she were
part of the process of making movies as powerful
and exciting as they could be. Such devotion to
movies gave her position dignity, as well. Her
writing led you to believe that a critic was as
important as a director, producer, or actor in the
evolution of the movies. Criticism for her was a
vocation, not a disease or a curse, but a pursuit
in which you could contribute to your field of
interest without demeaning it or cheapening
yourself.
If in my mind I connect any other writer to
Pauline Kael it is usually M.F.K. Fisher, who
wrote about food among other things, but
famously not about wars or love. Fisher believed
that things as ordinary as lunch deserved to be
written about well. "There is a communion of
more than our bodies when bread is broken and
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wine drunk," she wrote. ''And that is my answer,
when people ask me: Why do you write about
hunger, and not wars or love?" And what, other
than lunch, is as ordinary as a Saturday afternoon at the movies? For Pauline Kael the movies
were what food was to Fisher-a calling, a mystery, and a delight. "There is nothing quite like
that moment when the lights go down and all
our hopes are concentrated on the screen," Kael
wrote. In one sentence she articulated that
moment that we all feel when we're waiting for
that first image, that first scrap of sound. "Our
hopes are concentrated on the screen." There is
something about human beings that needs
movies and quiets when confronted with them,
and Kael understood that.
Like Fisher, Kael stood proud by her subject,
refusing to admit that it might be somehow
unworthy because it was just the movies, though
there were those who would persuade her otherwise. As she writes in the forward to Going
Steady, "I had never had a regular weekly
column and I had just about given up hope that
it was really possible to be a movie critic when
The New Yorker offered me one." You feel her
frustration in this passage. The thought had
occurred to her that she might be called for
something that had no interest in her, and this
revelation is terrifying to us as well as to her.
Thank goodness for The New Yorker and
William Shawn, to whom Kael paid tribute as
"an editor who loves movies and who never said
those obscene words: 'Our readers won't be
interested in all that.' " A good editor, one who
trusts your writing, is indeed a blessing, and Kael
appears not to have found such a champion
before Mr. Shawn. You can feel a sense of relief
in one of her early pieces for the magazine. Con-

sidering the movie "Sweet November," she
writes, "This movie assumes that characters are
liberated and healthy when they behave like kids
-flying model airplanes and so on. There seems
to be almost no way for a sixties movie to suggest that adults might take pride and pleasure in
their work, or might need to find work in which
they can take pride and pleasure." The New
Yorker gave her the chance to do work in which
she took pride and pleasure. It is as if it saved
her life.
For Kael movies were entirely deserving of
good writing, though the writing never praised
its subject undeservedly, or took on an overwrought or pretentious style. There are no selfimportant proclamations in Kael's writing, no
milestones-in-American-film-histories or oneof-the-year's-ten-bests in Kael's body of work,
and certainly nothing so vulgar as a "thumbs
up/thumbs down" system. Instead, Kael selfconsciously chose language that reflected film's
place in our popular culture. Consider this passage from her review of (the first) "Planet of
The Apes":
"Planet of the Apes" is a very entertaining
movie, and you'd better go see it quickly,
before your friends take the edge off it by
telling you about it.[S]equences that work
only at a simple level of parody while you're
watching them turn out to be really funny
when the total structure is revealed. You're
too busy for much disbelief anyway; the
timing of each action or revelation is right
on the button.

She writes as if she were having a phone conversation with her audience, which is an entirely
appropriate way to discuss movies. Her voice is
entirely American, though there are no Rex
Reedisms. At the same time, Kael's instruction is
gentle and gracious. She did not stoop to maliciousness, and you get the feeling that's because
she respected movies so. If she had something
bad to say she framed it with praise. So "Planet
of the Apes" is "very entertaining" and "funny."
But this was a demanding critic, and she never
swayed from her standards, so the language
doesn't feel light, despite the graciousness in her
voice. "Planet of the Apes," she goes on to write
in that same review, "is one of the best sciencefiction fantasies ever to come out of Hollywood.
That doesn't mean it's art."

You get the feeling that, like Fisher and other
writers who know that their voices matter
though they may be crying in a wilderness, Kael
fought to practice her vocation so she could protect her subject. As Fisher fought to protect food
from nutritional scientists, Kael fought to protect the movies from the people who call movies
"films." Indeed, Kael was entirely suspicious of
this tendency for those of us who love film to
find art in what is simply compelling or interesting, or in the case of "Planet of the Apes,"
downright frightening in movies. Did she ever
use the word "film" to write about a movie? A
cursory glance through her books yields the
word "movie" on every page, and one "picture,"
but it is as if she were using language to distance
herself from people who talk and write about
and go to "films." We such people can be a selfrighteous lot, but Kael had no patience for selfrighteous nonsense. Kael was unabashed in the
pleasure she took from movies and praised
movies for the sake of the pleasure they gave her.
So she refused to justify her joy by reading anything important into movies that had nothing
important to say. Her review of "Star Trek II" is
a perfect example of her regard for a film that
was fun and didn't try to be more.
Kael's understanding and championing of
the idea that it is okay to admit that part of
cinema's affect on us derives entirely from how
a movie entertains us is important because it
placed the critic in the center of a movie's audience. She was one of the few critics who cared
that she was having fun without surrendering
completely to what the mass market might find
irresistable. Her interest in pleasure showed us
that the critic, though she may be teaching us as
she's writing, is still interested in the same things
we are: is this movie going to stir something in
us? Is it going to capture us for two hours and
possibly many others beyond that? I think that
sometimes Kael was even looking for physical
sensations, that same shiver of anticipation that
we have when "our hopes are concentrated on
the screen." This pleasure is Kael's first priority,
and appears to have been a factor in titles she
chose for her books. She called the collection of
her earliest reviews I Lost It At the Movies. The
first collection of reviews that she did for The
New Yorker was titled, aptly, Going Steady .
Then there was Kiss Kiss Bang Bang, which Kael

claims to have borrowed from an Italian movie
poster. Of this title, Kael writes, these "words
are perhaps the briefest statement imaginable of
the basic appeal of movies. This appeal is what
attracts us, and ultimately what makes us
despair when we begin to understand how
seldom movies are more than this." If pleasure
is the first priority, than it must also involve
nourishment to sustain us. The reverse is true
for food, as M.F.K. Fisher knew well. Europe
starving after the Great War shocked Fisher not
just for the "distended stomachs" it created, but
for the "dulled palates."
But even the food-snob Fisher knew enough
not to let food stand in the way of what is true
about hunger. For this reason she advocated
keeping "cheeses in glass" (yes, Cheez Whiz) on
hand for those wartime evenings during blackouts when you might nevertheless have to
soothe a frightened neighbor. Pauline Kael's
answer to Cheez Whiz was her tract "Trash, Art,
and the Movies," which served her as a sort of
manifesto. In it she objected to films being
taught in schools as if they were "lyric poems"
whose meaning the serious watcher must ferret
out. She was suspicious of "meaning" and more
skeptical of "intention." Kael delightedly points
out that with American movies the "intention"
is to make money, and goes on to say, ''Art is still
what teachers and ladies and foundations believe
in, it's civilized and refined, cultivated and
serious, cultural, beautiful, European, Oriental:
it's what America isn't and it's especially what
American movies are not." Instead, she says.
Movie art is not the opposite of what we
have always enjoyed in movies, it is not to
be found in a return to that official high
culture, it is what we have always found
good in movies only more so. It's the subversive gesture carried further, the move-
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ments of excitement sustained longer and
extended into new meanings. At best, the
movie is totally informed by the kind of
pleasure we have been taking from bits and
pieces of movies.

Then she goes on to call some of the most wellreviewed American movies as "the worst inflated
pompous trash." We don't look at movies the
right way, she was saying, and so we think what's
good is trash, and what's trash is good. She then
goes on to apply the label "pompous trash" to
some of our "best-loved" movies, "To Kill A
Mockingbird" and "In the Heat of the Night"
included.
For me, the joy of reading Kael is all about
this aesthetic, this understanding that film is
something different entirely from lyric poetry,
or the visual and the performing arts and her
insistence that we should talk about it differently
than we talk about other things. In the few years
since I began reading her work she has been my
best film teacher and she still has much to teach
me about how to write and think about movies.
My generation was weaned on Disney, and
before we learned to write, "Star Wars" had
appeared. You don't need to think about how
such a film would affect a pre-literate population, for we have the filmmaker Kevin Smithwho is my age and hilarious-to show us. Kael
gave "Star Wars" two paragraphs. It dismayed
her, and with good reason; it was kiss kiss bang
bang and that's all. Even though we know better
now, my peers and I can't get enough of it and
filmmakers of our generation, like Smith, selfconsciously refer to it. But I know Kael was right
on the money; no matter how nostalgic I feel for
"Star Wars" I see clearly and plainly what she
saw and I feel that despair, not just for that one
movie, but because, as she wrote, "movies are
seldom more than this."

f

the significance of Bruce Cockburn

D.S. Martin

"Slid out of my dreams like a baby out of the
nurse's hands/ on to the hard floor of day... "
This is the startling simile Bruce Cockburn uses
to open his 1999 CD "Breakfast In New Orleans,
Dinner In Timbuktu." It's an immediate
reminder of his consistently powerful songwriting that now spans 27 albums. The interplay
of Cockburn's electric guitar and the driving
force of the rhythm section that opens this track,
"When You Give It Away," is also a reminder of
his musical progression over the past three
decades. Bruce Cockburn (pronounced Coburn) is a significant figure-not only because of
his artistic strengths as a composer, lyricist and
guitarist-but also because of the less-travelled
spiritual road he's taken in his career, and the
possibilities it has opened for others to follow.
In the early 70s the gospel music industry
had made a reluctant peace with the emerging
"Jesus music," releasing albums by sanctioned
singers such as Randy Matthews and Andre
Crouch who knew how to play by their rules. It
was a naive, new genre: a cross between traditional gospel music and the earthy folk and rock
of the new generation. Some of the performers
such as John and Terry Talbot of "Mason
Proffit" (Warner Bros.), or Phil Keaggy of
"Glass Harp" (MCA), had come from the secular music industry, where they had sought to
express their faith; they quickly adapted to the
expectations of Contemporary Christian Music.
Despite the shoestring budgets and artistic limitations some of it wasn't bad. Eventually, some
artists who had tried to straddle the fence-such
as Larry Norman (Verve) or Noel Paul Stookey
(Warner Bros.)-found better access to the
market (for a time) by taming their lyrics, and
playing the game.

When Bruce Cockburn experienced his conversion, he'd already established himself as one
of Canada's finest acoustic guitarists and folk
songwriters. He had a loyal base of fans-and a
very supportive record label, True North, which
didn't try to control the content of his music,
and had major distribution through CBS
Canada. Beginning with his fifth album, "Salt,
Sun And Time" (1974), Cockburn felt free to
express his faith, but he could also freely express
himself in any way he chose. "In the Falling
Dark" (1976) boldly begins with Cockburn
singing, "Lord of the starfields/ Ancient of Days/
Universe Maker/here's a song in your praise ... "
As Cockburn continued to be successful in
Canada, with songs such as "Wondering Where
The Lions Are" (his first US hit) and "Rumours
Of Glory" getting substantial radio play, American Christians were starting to take notice.
Here was a real artist who sang about the real
world, social injustice, and Jesus tool By 1980
his album "Humans" had their attention. They
were even willing to overlook him crudely
singing of "grey-suited businessmen" relieving
themselves, on the single "Tokyo," because of
the other things he so artfully sang. "It's all too
easy/ to let go of hope/ to think there's nothing
worth saving/ and let it all go up in smoke/ what
about the bond/ what about the mystic unity/
what about the bond/ sealed in the loving presence of the Father."
In many ways Bruce Cockburn was blazing
a trail through an uncharted wilderness-a
region of artistic freedom that other Christian
musicians desired too. British and American
singers, who wanted to avoid the obscurity of
independent labels, did not experience this
freedom. Richie Furay, who'd been a significant
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member of both Buffalo Springfield and Poco,
released three albums for Asylum Records in the
late 70s with many songs about his new-found
faith, yet never once saying the name "Jesus."
Finally, in frustration, Furay left for contemporary Christian music, where his old fans would
never hear him. Even the radical conversion of
Bob Dylan, and his later return to performing
his early material, didn't put record companies
in the mood to give artists creative freedom.
Because he is a Canadian singer-songwriter
who usually records in Canada (rather than connecting to the network of American musicians),
and doesn't perform on many other artists'
recordings (because he's too busy touring with
his own band) you might think Cockburn's influence would be quite limited. This simply is not
true.
Bruce Cockburn has never been a part of the
gospel music industry, nor does he belong there,
but has an obvious connection through the late
Mark Heard. Heard had felt restricted creatively
within the gospel music business, and finally, by
the late 80s, had formed his own record company, Fingerprint Records. Bruce Cockburn is
thanked in the credits of Heard's final album
"Satellite Sky" (1992)-and on the 1994 Mark
Heard tribute album, "Strong Hand Of Love"
(Fingerprint/Myrrh), Cockburn sings the title
track. It could be argued that just about every
folk or rock musician from the community of
faith that excels artistically has some connection
to Mark Heard.
Another major influence on cutting edge
Christian musicians is T Bone Burnett. Burnett
is a major Los Angeles record producer, and a
Christian, who's far more connected with secular record companies than religious ones. He
produced the rootsy soundtrack for the recent
movie, "0 Brother, Where Art Thou?" (Mercury). His own albums have been released by
MCA, Warner and Columbia, and he's produced
records for many stars: Los Lobos, Elvis
Costello, Roy Orbison, The Wallflowers, as well
as Bruce Cockburn's "Nothing But A Burning
Light" (1991 ) and "Dart To The Heart" (1994).
Burnett and his wife, Sam Phillips, both make
appearances on Cockburn's self-produced,
"Christmas", album. She once toured with just
one musician backing her: Mark Heard. This
interconnectedness between these artists shows
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a community of support and solidarity, even
when miles separate them.
The final significant connection to Bruce
Cockburn I must mention here is Bono of the
Irish band, U2. Bono (Paul Hewson) and some
fellow band members had come to faith just at
the time they were establishing themselves internationally. How were they to be real in a world
where the only ones who spoke seriously about
God seemed to be televangelists? Having Cockburn, Burnett and Dylan to reflect upon made
the wilderness seem passable. In the song "God
Part II," on the album "Rattle And Hum"
(Island/1988), Bono quotes from Cockburn's
song "Lovers In A Dangerous Time":
" .. .I heard a singer on the radio late

last night
Says he's gonna kick the darkness till
it bleeds daylight
I. . .I believe in love"

Bruce Cockburn is respected by other musicians, by both believers and unbelievers, because
of his integrity as an artist. The trail he's been
blazing has many obstacles, and, like all pioneering work, is not easy. Coming to faith was
only one of the many transitions he has been
through-all of which contribute to the Bruce
Cockburn we hear today. The tension of trying
to be both an evangelical, and a musician within
the secular music industry was difficult. His God
songs made unbelievers uncomfortable, but he
himself was often uncomfortable with the
church-particularly with the "religious right"
in the United States. When his marriage crumbled, he was even less acceptable to them than
before, and at the same time he lost some of his
joyful optimism. On "Inner City Front" (1981)
he sees himself as a loner and asks, "What's been
done in the name of Jesus" (and Buddha, and
Islam, etc.). The cover artwork for that album
shows him sitting in a cafe filled with soldiers, a
cigarette dangling from his lip and a beer on the
table, as if to tell his Christian audience that he
doesn't fit their expectations. His disillusionment is tangible on the song "Broken Wheel":
"Way out on the rim of the galaxy/ The gifts of
the Lord lie torn/ Into whose charge the gifts
were given/ Have made it a curse for so many to
be born ... " In the bridge between the second
and third verses, Bruce sings what seems to

express the pain of his failed marriage: "You and
me-we are the break in the broken wheel/
Bleeding wound that will not heal/ Lord, spit on
our eyes so we can see/ How to wake up from
this tragedy... "
From the beginning he has had a strong concern for the plight of the poor and oppressed.
Sometimes it made him sound like an Old Testament prophet (which would please the evangelical community), and sometimes like a left-wing
political activist (which might not). In the song
"Gavin's Woodpile" (1976) he expressed outrage at mercury poisoning in a northern Ontario
nver:
I remember crackling embers
coloured windows shining through the rain
like the coloured slicks on the English River
death in the marrow and death in the liver
and some government gambler with his mouth
full of steak
saying "if you can't eat the fish, fish in some
other lake.
To watch a people die-it is no new thing."

It wasn't just the environmental damage he was
protesting, but the harm done to the native
people who relied on fishing for their survival.
Through his world travels his sense of injustice
intensified and his leftist political views became
stronger.
His most controversial album, "Stealing
Fire" (1984), expressed his anti-Washington
views concerning the fighting in Nicaragua. His
single, "If I Had A Rocket Launcher," which
received considerable MTV airplay, not only
expressed his uncomfortable desire for violent
retaliation against government forces, but also
expressed it in street language that would limit
its radio access. Again, his role was that of a
spokesman for the victims, and once more he
felt disenfranchised from conservative Christianity in the US. Clearly he was intentionally
distancing himself from them, but not from his
faith in God. On the same album he sings of
"spirits open to the thrust of grace ... ", and that,
"maybe the poet is ... the voice of the spirit/ in
which case you'd better hear it... "Some of his
anger has been bleached into sad resignation,
over the next decade, by our unceasing global
inhumanity and by a more settled personal life,
but every stage of his pilgrimage can be heard in
his newest releases.

There are many aspects to the music of
Bruce Cockburn that make it appealing. He is a
very talented guitarist who can create enough
music from a single acoustic guitar to make it
sound like several. I remember the first time I
saw him play live: it was a solo show in 1978 and
I was in the second row at Toronto's Massey
Hall. When he concluded his incredible instrumental "Water Into Wine" (from "In The Falling
Dark") the audience rose for a standing ovation.
Not only had I been able to witness close-athand his skill, but I was also close enough to see
Cockburn blush at the applause.
Musically he has progressed significantly
through the years, not willing to conform to his
audience's expectation of how a Bruce Cockburn record sounds. In the 70s, under the production of Eugene Martynec, his was a clean
acoustic sound, but always tinged with the subtleties of jazz: a dancing flute-or a jarring
fluegelhorn or trumpet, fluttering in insect-like
patterns interplaying with Cockburn's acoustic
guitar. Even in those days the music was delicately layered and full, but very gradually he
traded in his troubadour sound. "Humans"
(1980) was not really a departure, as he began
introducing more of the "world beat" rhythms
that he'd encountered on his world tours, but
part of the natural progression continued from
"Dancing In The Dragon's Jaws" (1979). The
1980 single "Rumours Of Glory" was built on a
reggae platform, but throughout the album the
most dominant instrument is still Bruce's
acoustic guitar.
At this time Bruce was touring with a band,
rather than solo; his electric guitar became more
prominent, because of the difficulties of having
the guitar heard over the drums and electric bass
in a live setting, and because some of the subjects
he was writing about fit better into a rock
format. After "The Trouble With Normal"
(1983) production was taken over by long-time
Cockburn keyboard player, Jon Goldsmith
(sometimes with Kerry Crawford). Violinist
Hugh Marsh, and his brother, bass and stick
player, Fergus Marsh, had each played separately on Cockburn recordings; they were
brought together into Cockburn's band for
recording and touring in time for 1985's "World
Of Wonders." Through these years the sound
grew fuller, even on ballads; again, this was

probably because he was recording with the
touring band in mind. And what a tight and versatile band it was! I was fortunate enough to be
in the audience on one of the nights Cockburn's
"Live" album was recorded. Since that time
Hugh has done studio work (including for
Brooks Williams and Loreena McKennitt) and
Fergus played on Mark Heard's final three CDs.
They are both, now, members of Steve Bell's
band (Check out Bell's live album "Each Rare
Moment" from Rhythm House Records).
The main difference between the recordings
of the late 80s and those of the 1990s is the
change from beautifully complex arrangements
to beautifully simple ones. When T Bone Burnett took over production, his less-is-more
approach augmented Cockburn's talent as a guitarist and composer. On "Nothing But A
Burning Light" appear the first two instrumentals on a Cockburn album since the late seventies-("Further Adventures Of" in 1978) when
they had been a regular feature-and Bruce has
returned to including instrumentals ever since.
His recent producers-Burnett, and Colin
Linden (who co-produced the latest two studio
albums with Cockburn)-have helped him to
reintroduce Bruce the troubadour without displacing Cockburn the urban rocker. Cockburn's
transitions have naturally continued. In many
ways his sound is becoming a synthesis of some
of his earliest guitar playing, and his more recent
electric sounds.
When Cockburn first found faith, he wore
his beliefs on his sleeve. Part of what he later
showed of himself in the 80s was a reaction to,
and a distancing from, conservative organized
religion in the States. His songs still bore witness
to faith, although less-overtly Christian; for
example on "The Gift" from "Big Circumstance" (1988) where he sings appreciatively of
"the prayers of strangers," he continues:
In this cold commodity culture where you
lay your money down
it's hard to even notice
that all this earth is hallowed groundharder still to feel it,
basic as a breathlove is stronger than darkness
love is stronger than death .. .
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He did (and does) still identify himself as a
Christian, which he reasserted with his 1991
recording of Blind Willie Johnson's "The Soul
Of A Man" (from which the title "Nothing But
A Burning Light" comes) and his own Advent
song "Cry Of A Tiny Babe" (which inspired him
to follow it up with an entire Christmas album).
References to his faith walk have been left open
to wider interpretations on recent CDs. On
"Breakfast... ", for example, he says, "[We]
glimpse only sometimes the amazing breadth of
heaven." And yet, these references persist.
Cockburn has never pretended to be what
he isn't; he's neither hid his Christianity from
nonbelievers, nor hid his nonconformity from
the church. Still he questions how much of his
real self people have seen. On "Pacing The
Cage" (from "The Charity Of Night" 1996) he
sings, "I've proven who I am so many times/ the
magnetic strip's worn thin/ and each time I was
someone else/ and everyone was taken in ... "
And on "When You Give It Away" (continuing from this column's opening lines) he sings:
Deep in the city of the saints and fools
Pearls before pigs and dung become jewels
I sit down with tigers, I sit down with lambs
None of them know who exactly I am.
It seems to me, this speaks of what Bruce has

learned through the years. He sings of love,
beauty, spirituality and corruption, but his messages are now given for those with ears to hear.
He says much about his own journey in the final
"Thanks to" in the liner notes of "The Charity
Of Night": "God for always keeping the ladder
inplace."

f

most recommended CDs:
In The Falling Dark (1976)
Humans (1980)
Stealing Fire (1984)
Nothing But A Burning Light (1991)
The Charity Of Night (1996)
contact the author at ds_martin@yahoo.com

booklines
The destruction in New York and
Washington on September 11 has led
me to return to a set of books which are
not, even for me, obvious choices.
True, I now have Samuel Huntington's
The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (New York,
1996) purchased on September 12,
along with the inestimable Kenneth
Cragg' s translation of the Koran next
to my bed. Those are, however,
attempts to understand another side of
the developing conflict. In the stress of
the moment, however, I find not only
the actions and reasons of suicide
bombers strange, but find equally
strange all the ways of the human heart.
It is not just a sect of Islam, or the
broader Islamic world which intrigues
me; I ask myself again and again what
it means to be an American, what it
means to be a inheritor of western civilization. For me the crisis following the
attacks of September 11th acts as both
telescope and microscope; that which
was far off and seemingly remote I now
study with intense interest, as simultaneously I investigate with equal attention that which was always nearby,
seemingly familiar and certain.
These perplexing times have led me
to a set of authors connected with
wartime Oxford. After seeing the
burning World Trade Centers in an
Oxford TV store's shop window, my
first action on returning to my room
was to pull down a copy of C.S. Lewis'
The Weight of Glory and Other Essays,
(San Francisco, 2001) to my mind the
finest collection of Lewis' essays-fine
both for the mental acuity and the emotional heft of the essays. I re-read
"Learning in War-time" and now
understand more profoundly what
Lewis was saying.
This essay began life as a sermon
with an extraordinary pastoral intent.
The Pastor of the University Church of

St. Mary was worried about the
response of undergraduates to the onset
of what seemed certain to be a cataclysmic war, one which, in all likelihood, would put an end to the brief
dawn that followed the barbaric night
of 1914-18 and would destroy Western
Civilization as it had existed for a thousand years. The Pastor thought that
Lewis, both a don at Magdalene College and a wounded veteran of the
trenches, would be an ideal person to
speak to the fears of the academic multitude. With the burden of those expectations Lewis climbed up to the high,
overhanging pulpit in the University
Church on October 22, 1939.
As in any great piece of rhetoric,
Lewis begins by subverting our expectations, by pulling our assumptions out
from beneath us. How can we can
study while people are dying? Why
begin tasks that may have no ending?,
we may wonder. Lewis then ruthlessly
points out that every Christian should
ask at all times and in all places "how
it is right, or even psychologically possible, for creatures who are every
moment advancing either to heaven or
to hell to spend any fraction of the
little time allowed them in this world
on such comparative trivialities as
literature or art, mathematics or
biology." Lewis seizes his audience by
the scruff of the neck, drags our gaze
away from the threatening battlefield,
and forces us to look down into the
Abyss. "To admit that we can retain
our interest in learning under the
shadow of these eternal issues, but not
under the shadow of a European war
would be to admit that our ears are
closed to the voice of reason and very
wide open to the voice of our nerves
and our mass emotions. "
Realizing that Lewis wrote against a
backdrop of war and human suffering
has led me to reconsider how J.R.R.
Tolkien may have been affected by
those same events as he struggled to

write his Lord of the Rings. Tolkien vigorously resisted the suggestion that any
part of his epic should be seen as an
allegory. But, fantasy or not, it is impossible to imagine it being written at any
other time than in the middle of the
twentieth century. The influences, the
nuances, the struggles, all are best visible in the strong light of World Wars.
To a large extent Tolkien, like Lewis,
resisted the idea of the Second World
War as an event with consequences any
more eternal than those of interacting
with one's neighbor. Thus the wizard
Gandalf's irritated speech to a man
obsessed with the defense of his realm
against the evil of the demonic Sauron:
. .. the rule of no realm is·mine.
But all worthy things that are in
peril as the world now stands,
those are my care. And for my
part, I shall not wholly fail of my
task, though Condor should
perish, if anything passes through
this night that can still grow fair
or bear fruit and flower again in
days to come. For I also am a
steward. Did you not know?
C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien's connection to this city of Oxford and to
each other is well known. T.S. Eliot's
connection to Oxford is not, and is
rather dismissively treated by his most
popular biographer, Peter Ackroyd
(New York, 1984). Eliot, while he
resided in the London area for the duration of the war, was a frequent visitor
to Oxford in order to attend meetings
of the group known as "the Moot."
This was a group of "wise men," and a
few women, who met regularly in
Oxford during the war to discuss the
shape of the civilization which would
emerge from out of the ruins of war.
The Moot (from the Saxon word for
council or debating society), was composed of such diverse characters as the
German emigre sociologist Karl
Mannheim, the Hungarian refugee
chemist Michael Polanyi, historian

Christopher Dawson, and Eliot, all
bound together under the charismatic
influence of the Anglican missionary
and social activist Joe Oldham. The
impression one gets from reading their
discussions is that they were absolutely
convinced, as so many were, that the
Second World War would be the death
blow to European civilization; where
the First World War had crippled, this
war would kill. That Eliot took this possibility seriously, as well as his responsibility to carefully consider the constitution of a proper culture and society, can
be seen in the two essays merged
together in the volume Christianity and
Culture (1960). They should not be
considered apart from their wartime
origins in Oxford, and Eliot's and the
Moot's fears for the health of their
world, and their determination that
Christians provide some therapy for it.
It is not too surprising, then, that
neither Tolkien nor Lewis was ever
invited to a meeting of the Moot. Certainly both thought that the war was a
horrific tragedy, and indeed both seem
to have believed at the beginning of
the war that this was really it-the
final war, a "war to end all wars," but
in a way Woodrow Wilson never imagined. Yet they remained so firmly fixed
on the eternal destinies not only of
human souls, but of the very trees and
flowers of the earth, that they preserved a certain spiritual detachment
from contemporary events. This perhaps could be said to have made them
"so heavenly minded that they were no
earthly good." The Moot, on the
other hand, sometimes seems to find
Christianity but a rather useful means
of social amelioration.
Both of these are exaggerations, to
be sure, and I feel almost ashamed to
make them of predecessors to whom
my debts are very great; but while they
are exaggerations, they are not false
representations. Whatever the future
months and years may bring, it is certainly our duty now and in all the years
of our life that lie ahead to bring these
two lobes of the Christian mind
together so that we can properly take
every thought captive to Christ. Not
that we shouldn't have been doing it
before, as Lewis would vociferously
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remind me; but as he might also agree,
after a rejoinder from Eliot, it is in the
condition of crisis that "we see unmistakably the sort of universe in which we
have all along been living, and must
come to terms with it." What truly
matters is indeed the neighbor next to
us, who "next to the Blessed Sacrament
itself. . .is the holiest object presented
to your senses." God forgive us if we
forget that, now, after so great a witness
of that essential Christian truth. But
insofar as we are gifted to do so, we
must also think communally, deeply
and passionately about the time and
place in which we find ourselves. Those
are things that the onslaught of a war
should find us doing, and something
which should not change with the
coming of peace.
Albert Louis Zambone

Clare Sue Kidwell, Homer Noley,
George E. "Tink" Tinker. A Native
American Theology. Maryknoll: Orbis
Books, 2001.
Perhaps the most useful thing
offered by this straightforward but
oddly ineffectual book is the authors'
sobering attack upon the sort of New
Age spirituality that is making capital of
Native American culture these days.
The sweat lodge and vision quest set
just can't get enough of that homogenized or even wholly fictive 'tradition'," the one peddled by such metaphysical celebrities as Lynn Andrews or
Jamake Highwater, a "tradition" that
has little or nothing to do with
authentic Indians and their practices.
And these practices were themselves
banned until 1934 while the United
States was busy trying to turn Indians
into white people.
So Euro-America's attempted
appropriation of Native religious life is
doubly offensive to Kidwell, Noley, and
Tinker, three professors laying out a
brief systematics for what Christianity
might look like if reimagined consistent
with Native American experience,
values, and worldview: one, for this
cruel irony, an irony that has yet to

deflate popular culture' s love for its
invented and romanticized Indian holy
heroes, and secondly, because Native
Americans' often sincere desire to
become Christian has regularly been
coupled with the requirement they
cease being Indian, so hopelessly identified with "Amer-European" culture
and values is the colonizer's religion.
They particularly skewer poet Gary
Snyder as an example of the spiritual
dilettante who, because religion cannot
be "owned," feels he has as much right
as Native Americans to "pursue and
articulate " their belief systems. But
these beliefs are owned, say the authors.
And any attempt by conquering nonNatives to coopt them for their own
well-being are merely attempts to
"own" the heritage of Natives "as thoroughly as they claim to own the land
and its resources."
Still, this attack comes in the final
chapter of a book that suggests Indians
can appropriate Christianity-or the
good parts, anyway -and do so
knowing their Creator, "the creative
force behind all things that exist," can
also be accepted "as the Christian
God ." Or not. It doesn' t matter.
Christianity has absolutely no claim to
absoluteness. There is nothing of existential import in the gospel of Jesus
Christ, nor any exclusive benefit for the
Christian. And the authors do not provide any compelling reason why a
Native American person would want to
be one.
Traditional Native American religious life, a unique existence of
ongoing relationship with spiritual
beings and an individual's responsibility to their own, is wholly sufficient
for its adherents' realization of selfhood. Indian religions are not built
around dogmas or doctrines but ritual
observance, "centered on and in the
community." In this context, to "put
on" Christ is equivalent to a white
person's putting on a turquoise watchband or beaded belt from a stand at the
Grand Canyon-nice, but not necessary; the job can be done another way.
Christianity's emphasis on a singularly
identifiable supreme being and doctrines of sin and salvation, the authors
say, cannot be intelligibly discussed in

the context of Native traditions. The
very ground of Christ's birth and crucifixion is questionable in Indian eyes.
That a loving father would give his only
son to die an excruciating death for the
benefit of his enemies is a notion a
group of Choctaws in Mississippi found
"incomprehensible and almost beyond
human belief."
While the limits of both understanding and faith are tested by Christianity's claims, the entire enterprise
that allows one to see all the world's
religions-and in this case, especially
those of the Americas' indigenous peoples-as equally valid and non-exclusive pursuits of the truth is one large
appeal to reason and the inclusivity of
belief. A reasonable God, the theory
goes, would not confine its self-revelation to one time and place. What this
means its that culture is king. For
Native Americans, the forces of nature
are spirits available for personal relationships; human beings are not subject
to an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnipresent supreme being but active
participants in the processes of the natural world. However, in a meeting
between Christianity and this spirituality of immanent power, the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent God is
subject to the dictates of culture-God
must abide by its parameters if God
desires to reach human beings.
With this understanding, Kidwell
and company offer a series of parallels
between Native religious life and what
is to be found in the classic categories
of Christian systematics-deity, christology, theological anthropology, etc.
What emerges is not a melding-uneasy
or otherwise-of central concepts, but
"an indigenous interpretation of the
colonizer's own texts." This interpretation does not go the way of liberation
theology's identifying Christ with the
oppressed or salvific righteousness as
real-time service to the same. It minimizes Christ's role, especially in anything having to do with an atoning sacrifice, something Indian peoples neither
need nor want.
For the most part, this is handled
with convincing expedience in prose

that, while never too aggressive, also
never rises above the ordinary. But one
early example of selective hermeneutics
undercuts the authors' trustworthiness.
The passage they're treating is from
Acts of the Apostles, chapter four, and
is presented like this:
Be it known to you all, and to all
the people of Israel, that by the
name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth,
whom you crucified, whom God
raised from the dead, by him this
man is standing before you well
. ...And there is salvation in no
one else, for there is no other
name under heaven given among
human beings by which we must
be saved.
What they wish to prove is that, since
the verb for healing means both medical
healing and spiritual salvation, it should
be seen consistently in its first meaning
throughout these verses. So the man
standing before the court well has been
healed by the name of Jesus, there is
healing in no one else, and no other
name has been given by which humans
are to be healed. Therefore this passage
is not a witness to any exclusive soteriological power belonging to Christ.
It is instead a call to the apostles'
audience (and the reader) to investigate
the name in which this miraculous
healing of a lame man has taken place.
For while the authors find Peter's claim
that healing can be affected by no name
other than Jesus' "ludicrous if not
patently false," they do feel an understanding of the shortened form of
Joshua will explain it. The noun ja is an
abbreviated jahweh, one of the Hebrew
names for God; the verb shua translates
"saves" or "heals": "Thus the name
Jesus means 'God Heals (or Saves)."'
Fair enough; the trouble is with the
ellipsis. What is left out is this: "He is
the stone which was rejected by you,
the builders, which is become the head
of the corner. Neither is there salvation
in any other. .. " Italicize that "neither,"
for which the authors use the equally
common "and." Not only does this talk
of the cornerstone serve as transition
between the healed man and the means
of his healing, the "neither" completes

the change, so that as the passage continues we have clearly left medical
healing behind and are speaking of
spiritual salvation.
Jesus does appear as a Trickster
character later on, and the authors
are comfortable with his being a
breaker of barriers and eraser of
boundaries. But they admit that the
Hopi trickster Masau'u is "the
boundary maker," a god of planting
and agriculture. This sets up another
misreading of the colonizer's texts
when they miss the existential significance of Matthew 22:15-22.
In the Pharisee's attempt at
ensnaring Jesus in his own words, Kidwell et. al. see a classic example of the
sacred fool, the holy mischief maker,
turning reality on its head-sort of Bugs
Bunny with cosmic capabilities. So
when Jesus is asked about the appropriateness of paying taxes and, referencing
the image on a coin, says, "Give to
Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and
give to God the things that are God's,"
the authors applaud, concluding, "The
slippery Trickster has once again eluded
his enemies. He will not so easily be
captured and rendered tame.
But what bears God's image? The
human being. The things that are
God's that are to be given to God are
human beings themselves. Kidwell,
No ley, and Tinker will have a hard time
finding many theologians who do not
think a returning of the self to its
source is an essential element of Christian existence.
Their intended point is that "truth
in the Christian sense cannot have
absolute meaning in the minds of
Indian Christians." Each Native culture's Trickster proves truth is "far too
slippery to be easily grasped."
So is their book. Its slipperiness
makes for uncomfortable reading and,
while their purpose of beginning a new
dialogue on the subject of Native Americans and Christianity-and Native
American Christians-is a good one,
this feels more like an opening gambit
than a clear statement of the issues.
].D. Buhl
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INHERITANCE
You, full moon, gave him to me
through three-quarter panes
of the kitchen door,
hydrangea draped like breasts
white in your light. You gave
all I asked like a warning,
a train whistle in the night.
Desire fulfilled.
A leafbed in autumn.
Who put the hair in my mouth,
disgusting, even my own,
among food I chewed?
Baldness is a blessing, hereditary,
like Jacob's patronage.
Mothers burden you with hopes
unanswered. Fathers are also a burden,
a seven year plague that earns
another seven year's servitude.
Stiff halters, a halo of gnats.
May our blind fathers bless
our fur-covered nakedness.
May our fathers leave us alone.
Wild is the way, the flume
shooting its waterfall
down a narrow chasm.
May the snakes slither from our path.
We have tamed the hilltop,
its crescent of mountains.
Trees cut and houses sprouting.
Wilderness framed
in the kitchen door.
It is better so.

Jean Hollander
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